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Abstract
Flexible labor markets require geographically mobile workers to be e¢ cient. Oth-
erwise rms can take advantage of the immobility of workers and extract rents at
the expense of workers. In cultures with strong family ties, moving away from home
is costly. Thus, to limit the rents of rms and avoid moving, individuals with strong
family ties rationally choose regulated labor markets, even though regulation gen-
erates lower employment and income. Empirically, we do nd that individuals who
inherit stronger family ties are less mobile, have lower wages, are less often employed
and support more stringent labor market regulations. We nd a positive associa-
tion between labor market rigidities at the beginning of the twenty rst century and
family values prevailing before World War II, and between family structures in the
Middle Ages and current desire for labor market regulation. Both results suggest
that labor market regulations have deep cultural roots.
1 Introduction
Labor market institutions di¤er across countries and stringent labor market regulations
persist despite being economically ine¢ cient.1 In the present paper we endogeneize the
choice of labor market institutions as a function of di¤erences in cultural values, proposing
We thank Murat Iyigun and seminar participants at Bocconi University, Brown University, Harvard
University, the Kaler meeting at UCLA, IZA, IIES (Stockholm), the London School of Economics, Har-
vard University, New York University, Princeton University, the Terry College of Business, UC Berkeley
Haas School of Business, University of Mannheim, University of Southern California, the AEA Meetings
(Denver), the CEPR Conference on Culture and Institutions in Milan and the Politics, Information and
the Macroeconomy conference in Barcelona for helpful comments.
1Most economists, although with varying emphasis, for example would argue that these regulations
are at least in part responsible for the high European unemployment from the eighties onward. For a
balanced view see Blanchard and Wolfers (2000).
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an interpretation based upon the complementarity between the strength of family ties and
the stringency of labor market regulation.2 Flexible labor markets require that individuals
move geographically in order to maximize their opportunities, nd the best match with
a rm and get the best paid job. This is e¢ cient when mobility is painless. However, in
certain cultures, staying close to the family is important and the mobility required by a free
labor market is painful. With unregulated labor markets, local rms would have a market
power (e.g. monopsonistic power) over immobile workers and would pay their reservation
wage which could be below their productivity. Thus workers with strong family ties would
favor labor regulation to counteract this power. This can lead to two di¤erent equilibria.
One is laissez-faire, with high mobility and unregulated labor markets; this occurs when
family ties are weak. When family ties are strong, there is another equilibrium with labor
market rigidity comprising minimum wage and ring restrictions. Given the cultural value
placed on family ties, labor market regulation is preferable to laissez-faire. Even though
laissez-faire produces higher income per capita it rarees family relations. If family ties
are su¢ ciently strong this relaxation of family relationships can reduce individual utility
so much that welfare can be higher with a regulated labor market.3
An innovative feature of our model is that individuals can choose the degree of family
ties, or to be more realistic, they can educate their children in a certain way. This implies
a two way e¤ect between family ties and labor market regulation. An inherited culture of
strong family ties leads to a preference for labor market rigidities, but the latter in turn
makes it optimal to teach and adopt strong family ties. Thus economic incentives explain
the evolution of cultural values and the other way around.
In our empirical analysis we study the interaction between family ties, labor market
institutions and outcomes. We motivate our analysis by documenting a strong correlation
2The most common explanations for the persistence of rigidities in the labor market rely upon various
versions of the insider-outsider model (Lindbeck and Snower (1989), Blanchard and Giavazzi (2003)
and Saint-Paul (2000)), in which unionized "inside" workers want to preserve their rents and want to
avoid competition from the outsiders. However, this interpretation does not explain why insiders are
more powerful in some countries than in others. In addition, the logic of this model implies that the
"outsiders" should oppose labor regulations, but in reality this is not the case. In fact those that could
be considered outsiders favor extending the coverage to themselves as well rather than liberalizing the
labor market.
3Our model does not have home production, but with strong family ties hours not spent at work can
be devoted to work at home. Thus adding home production would reinforce the result of the model
because lower work in the market would be less costly in strong family ties societies.
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at the country level between family ties (measured using a variety of subjective indicators
on family values and objective measures of family arrangements) and labor market regula-
tions. Our main empirical contribution relies however upon micro evidence. In particular,
to mitigate problems of omitted variables and reverse causality, we rely on evidence from
second generation immigrants in the US.4 We show that second generation immigrants
coming from familistic societies are less mobile, face a wage and employment penalty and
also ask for more government regulation of wages and job security. We also show that
the strength of family values inherited from the countries of origin before World War II
is positively correlated with the stringency of labor market regulation in the countries of
origin at the beginning of the 21st century. Using regional variation in medieval family
structures, we also document a correlation between desire for regulation today and the
structure of the family dating back at least to the Middle Ages. Overall our evidence
supports the idea that the relationship at the country level between actual regulation and
family values goes through an individual desire for regulation inuenced by transmission
of cultural values.
The present paper contributes to the growing literature on the importance of cultural
values in the determination of economic outcomes (see Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales-
2006- for a review). After establishing the relevance of cultural transmission (Bisin and
Verdier, 2000 and 2001),5 this literature has moved forward and started looking at the
interactions between culture and institutions. Tabellini (2008b) for example studies a
model where individuals respond to incentives but are also inuenced by norms of good
conduct inherited from earlier generations.6 We contribute to this literature by looking at
the interplay and coevolution of labor market institutions and a specic cultural trait of
4Cultural values are relatively slow to evolve, as a vast literature on the behavior of immigrants to
other countries, mainly the US, shows. See for instance Alesina and Giuliano (2010), Algan and Cahuc
(2005), Fernandez and Fogli (2006, 2009), Giuliano (2007), Guiso et al. (2006), Luttmer and Singhal
(2009) amongst many others.
5See Bisin and Verdier (2000, 2001). Their model has been applied to the transmission of religious
beliefs (Bisin and Verdier, 2000, and Bisin et al., 2004), of education (Patacchini and Zenou, 2006), of
ethnic identity (Bisin et al. 2006), of moral values (Tabellini, 2008b) and the transmission of priors about
the trustworthiness of others (Guiso et al. 2008).
6On the relationship between culture and institutions, Algan and Cahuc (2010) investigate the role
of civic virtue on labor market institutions. On the link from regulation and institutions to culture,
Alesina and Angeletos (2005), Alesina, Cozzi and Manotovan (2009), Alesina and Fuchs-Schündeln (2007),
Aghion et al. (2011) and Aghion et al. (2010) show that regulation can shape beliefs like the demand for
redistribution or beliefs in cooperation.
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a society, the strength of family ties. In addition, we look at the determinants of di¤erent
values regarding the family by tracking their origin to the existence of di¤erent forms of
family arrangements that go back to at least the Middle Ages.7
Our paper is also related to a vast area of research on labor market institutions and
labor market performance. In particular, our paper contributes to the literature looking
at the interaction between labor market institutions and geographical mobility (Hassler
et al., 2005).8 More broadly, our paper provides a di¤erent, but however complementary
analysis to the seminal insider outsider model on employment protection and minimum
wage (Saint-Paul 2000, 2002). Finally, our paper contributes to the literature stressing
the complementarity between investment in local social ties, including friends and family,
and geographical immobility.9 Finally note that the most common explanations for the
persistence of rigidities in the labor market rely upon various versions of the insider-
outsider model (Lindbeck and Snower (1989), Blanchard and Giavazzi (2003) and Saint-
Paul (2000)), in which unionized "inside" workers want to preserve their rents and want
to avoid competition from the outsiders. However, this interpretation does not explain
why insiders are more powerful in some countries than in others. In addition, the logic
of this model implies that the "outsiders" should oppose labor regulations, but in reality
this is not the case. In fact those that could be considered outsiders favor extending the
coverage to themselves as well rather than liberalizing the labor market.
The paper is organized as follows. The next section presents the model. Section 3
documents cross country correlations between family values and the regulation of labor.
7Alesina and Giuliano (2010) and Algan and Cahuc (2007) show that di¤erences in family culture
could help explain heterogeneity in labor market participation (especially for women and young adult).
8Hassler et al. (2005) nd a negative relationship between unemployment insurance and geographical
mobility. In their theoretical interpretation, di¤erences in the propensity to move are given and are not a
function of a particular cultural trait. Also the paper does not provide an empirical test of their theory.
9Glaeser, Laibson and Sacerdote (2002) argue that individuals who perceive themselves as being
strongly attached to a village, a township or a region, may invest in local social capital, because the
returns from these local ties are high while, on the other hand, strong local social capital raises the cost
of mobility and in turn reduces incentives to move. Spilimbergo and Ubeda (2004a) show that interactions
between social ties and moving decisions can explain the di¤erent behaviors of workers in di¤erent groups,
regions, or countries in an endogenous way by showing the existence of multiple equilibria. Glaeser and
Redlick (2008) show that it is possible that an area can get caught in a bad equilibrium where the
prospect of out-migration reduces social capital investment and a lack of social capital investment makes
out-migration more appealing. David, Janiak and Wasmer (2009) build a model that can include two
di¤erent equilibria: strong local social capital and low mobility vs. low social capital and high propensity
to move.
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Section 4 looks at economic outcomes and attitudes of second generation immigrants.
Section 5 further documents the issue of persistence and Section 6 concludes.
2 The model
2.1 The setup
There are two goods: labor and a numeraire good produced with labor and a continuum
of individuals of mass one. Individuals are uniformly located on the [0; 1] line. They are
identical, risk neutral and have no preference for leisure: their utility is equal to the sum
of their consumption and a term that represents the valuation of family ties to be dened
below. Family ties are public information. The timing is as follows:
1. At birth, every individual is located on the [0; 1] line, on a point where her parents
live. Then, individuals choose family values which can be either with strong family ties or
with low family ties. The choice of family values is irreversible. In reality family values
are "chosen" by parents and transmitted to children. However for the sake of simplicity
we collapse the model to a static case without intergenerational transmission of values.
Below we also make some progress toward extending our model in a dynamic direction.
The share of individuals with strong family ties is  2 [0; 1] to be determined endoge-
nously. Strong family ties yield an utility () > 0, if an individual lives in the same
location as her parents, and a disutility  () if he/she lives elsewhere. An individual
with weak family ties is indi¤erent between living in his location of birth or elsewhere,
thus  = 0 for any : We assume 0()  0. This assumption is plausible for a variety
of reasons. First, social norms are generally more inuential when they are more wide-
spread. Living in a community where most people have strong family ties create a strong
social norm to which one feels an incentive to conform. In addition, when the share of
the population with strong family ties is larger, individuals with weak family ties and
those who do not live in the neighborhood of their parents have less opportunities to have
social interactions. This may imply that the relative value of strong family ties compared
to weak family ties (which is normalized to zero) increases with the share of individuals
with strong family ties. It is worth stressing that the assumption that the valuation of
family ties depends on the share of individuals with strong family ties is innocuous for our
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main results. In particular our results hold even when 0() = 0, as it will become clear
below. But we start from the more general model in this section. Also note the di¤erence
between the mobility costs associated with family ties and those associated with simple
transaction costs of moving. The latter are not a choice variable and depend on the tech-
nology of transportation. Besides they are in general not decreasing with the number of
people who move; and, in fact, they can even increase in case of congestion.
2. With majority rule individuals vote on labor market regulation. By assumption
there are two possible types of labor market policies: either labor market exibility (i.e.
laissez-faire on the labor market), or regulation of wages and employment based upon
two instruments, a minimum wage and job protection.
3. Firms o¤er labor contracts. When a worker is hired in his/her initial location,
his/her productivity y is drawn from the uniform distribution on the interval [0; 1]. Every
worker can nd a job with productivity 1 in a place di¤erent from his/her initial loca-
tion. Job protection constrains rms to keep all employees whose productivity is above a
threshold value denoted by R 2 [0; 1] : Job protection entails deadweight losses c 2 [0; 1);
that is the production of a worker who draws the productivity y is equal to y  c; instead
of y:10 In each location, there is a single rm that o¤ers labor contracts. In this setup,
workers are paid at their reservation wage, which can be lower than their productivity
if there are mobility costs.11 When there is a minimum wage, workers can be either em-
ployed and paid the minimum wage, denoted by w; or unemployed. They are unemployed
if their productivity y is below the reservation productivity R of the rm.
The nature of these assumptions should be clear. A worker with weak family ties
would always manage to nd a job with productivity y = 1 since he bears no costs of
mobility. A worker with strong family ties has a moving cost of 2(): Without labor
market regulation, workers with strong family ties face the monopsony power of rms.
Labor market regulation protects these workers against those rms.
10The latter can take a variety of forms, including the distortionary cost of taxation needed to provide
unemployment subsides for those not employed in distorted labor market. We do not explicitly model
this channel.
11The important assumption here is that mobility costs decrease wages. This property could be obtained
in a search and matching model à la Mortensen and Pissarides, see e.g. Pissarides (2000).
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2.2 Solution
The model is solved by backward induction.
i) In stage 3, the labor market is either regulated or exible, and the share of individuals
with strong family ties is given.
Flexible labor market
If the labor market is exible, individuals with weak family ties obtain a wage equal
to 1 by moving at no cost. Their utility level is
UWF = 1: (1)
Individuals with strong family ties get a wage equal to 1 if they decide to leave their
initial location, but the move costs them 2(): Therefore, their reservation wage, which
is necessarily non negative, is equal to max[0; 1   2()]: Thus individuals with strong
family ties get a wage equal to 0 and stay in their initial location if () is larger than
1=2. In that case, their utility is equal to the valuation of family ties, (): If () is
smaller than 1=2; two possibilities can arise.
1. If their productivity in their initial location is larger than their reservation wage,
equal to 1 2(), they keep their job in their initial location. In that case, they are paid
their reservation wage and they are immobile. Their utility is equal to their reservation
wage plus the valuation of family ties, i.e. 1  2() + () = 1 ()
2. If their productivity in their initial location is smaller than their reservation wage,
individuals with strong family ties are not hired. Since () < 1=2; individuals with
strong family ties prefer to move and get a utility equal to 1 (): In conclusion, when
the labor market is exible, the utility of individuals with strong family ties is
USF = max[(); 1 ()]: (2)
Rigid labor market
If the labor market is regulated, the government sets a minimum wage and job pro-
tection. For every worker, the probability to get a job o¤er in the rm located in his/her
initial birth place is equal to the probability to draw a productivity y larger than the
reservation productivity R. With the uniform distribution, this probability is equal to
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1  R: If the productivity is higher than R; individuals can get the minimum wage w in
their birth place, or leave the rm and obtain a wage equal to 1   c elsewhere, where c
denotes deadweight losses associated with job protection.12 R and w are determined en-
dogenously below in equilibrium. When the productivity is lower than R; individuals get
either zero income if they do not move, or a wage equal to 1  c if they move. Individuals
with weak family ties get the expected utility
UWR = (1 R) max(1  c; w) +R(1  c): (3)
The expected utility of individuals with strong family ties is
USR = (1 R) max[w + (); 1  c ()] +Rmax[(); 1  c ()] (4)
ii) In stage 2, people vote on the labor market policy: either regulation or exibility.
The share of individuals with strong family ties, chosen in stage one, is given. There are
only two types of voters, so that the median voter can have either strong family ties or
weak family ties. We assume that the owners of the rms do not vote. If they did they
would always prefer labor market exibility regardless of the level of family ties therefore
they have a dominant strategy to vote for exibility. Their share of votes should be simply
added to those who vote for laissez-faire.13
- Individuals with weak family ties obtain UWF = 1 under labor market exibility, and
UWR < 1 under labor market regulation.
14 Therefore, individuals with weak family ties
always prefer labor market exibility. This implies that the outcome of the vote is labor
market exibility if the share of people with strong family ties, ; is smaller than 1=2:
- Now, consider the case where  > 1=2; so that the median voter has strong family
ties. For the sake of simplicity, assume that all individuals with strong family ties are
immobile if the majority of the population has strong family ties under exible labor
market. According to equation (2), this requires that:
12Assuming that rms can make counter o¤ers so that only weak family ties workers with productivity
y < 1   c and strong family ties workers with productivity y < 1   c   2() move, would not change
the qualitative results of the model.
13 In case workers own stocks of rms then some of them would face a trade o¤ between their interest
as stock holders and those as workers. We do not explore this extension here. In most countries the
percentage of individuals who hold stocks is small.
14When the labor market is rigid, the expected utility of workers with weak family ties is smaller than
1 because R 2 [0; 1] and the wage cannot be larger than 1  c: Otherwise rms would get negative prots.
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Assumption 1: (1=2) > 1
2
:
This assumption implies that when the labor market is regulated, workers with strong
family ties do not move. This case is easier to illustrate and we do so in the text. The
general case without that assumption is in the appendix.
Assumption 1 implies that the expected utility of individuals with strong family ties
when the labor market is exible and when  > 1=2 is:
USF = () (5)
On the other hand, the expected utility in the regulated scenario is given by:
USR = (1 R)w + (): (6)
Comparison of equations (5) and (6) shows that those with strong family ties prefer a
regulated labor market rather than a exible one.
The optimal labor market regulation is the set of values of the minimum wage w and
of the reservation productivity R that maximizes the expected utility of workers with
strong family ties, as dened by equation (6) and subject to the zero prot conditionZ 1
R
(y   c  w)dy = 0: (7)
It is easily checked that the solution is
R = c and w =
1  c
2
(8)
The solution shows that labor market regulation comprises a binding minimum wage and
job protection which forces rms to keep employees whose productivity is lower than their
labor cost. In this equilibrium, every worker with strong family ties can be either employed
(with probability 1  c) or unemployed (with probability c) and remains in his/her initial
location. Prots are equal to zero. The wage is smaller than 1 and also smaller than the
wage under exible labor markets. Employment is equal to 1   c; since all individuals
with weak family ties are employed (the share of individuals with strong family ties is
equal to ; and a share c of individuals with strong family ties are unemployed). Thus
employment is lower when the labor market is regulated, since employment is equal to 1
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when the labor market is exible. Workers with strong family ties get the expected utility
(see equations (6) and (8)):
USR =
(1  c)2
2
+ () (9)
which is larger than (); the utility they would get if the labor market were exible.
In conclusion, the outcome of the vote is for market regulation if  > 1=2 ; and for
labor market exibility otherwise.
iii) In stage 1, individuals choose their family values with perfect foresights. If they
anticipate that the share of individuals with strong family ties is smaller than 1=2; they
know that labor market exibility will prevail. Otherwise, the outcome of the vote will
be labor market regulation. Therefore, the payo¤ of individuals with strong family ties is
max[(); 1 ()] if   1=2
() + (1 c)
2
2
if  > 1=2;
and the payo¤ of individuals with weak family ties is15
1 if   1=2
1  c if  > 1=2:
Thus, the utility gains of choosing strong family ties rather than weak family ties are
 () =

max[(); 1 ()]  1 if   1=2
()  1 c2
2
if  > 1=2:
In a Nash equilibrium, every individual takes  as given and chooses strong family ties if
the gains of doing so are positive, and weak family ties otherwise. At this stage, it turns
out that there exists an equilibrium with weak family ties only if we make the relatively
innocuous:16
Assumption 2: when the share of population with strong family ties goes to 0, the utility
gains induced by strong family ties are smaller than the maximum wage gains obtained
by changing of location: (0) < 1:
15When the labor market is rigid, the minimum wage, w = (1   c)=2; obtained by immobile workers,
is smaller than 1  c; the wage of mobile workers. This implies that individuals with weak family ties are
always mobile.
16If this assumption were not satised then the value of family ties in a society where nobody else
values them is larger that the maximum salary that one can obtain in the market.
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2.3 Equilibria
Under assumptions 1 and 2, Figure 1 shows the function  () which implies two stable
Nash equilibria. There is an equilibrium (point A on Figure 1) where everybody chooses
weak family ties and then vote for labor market exibility. In that case, the labor market
is competitive: everyone is paid his marginal productivity. Labor mobility is high since
everyone changes his location in this equilibrium. On the other hand, there is another
equilibrium (point B on Figure 1) where everyone chooses strong family ties and then vote
for stringent labor market regulation. The labor market is monopsonistic because workers
are immobile. This is the reason why people vote for stringent labor market regulation.
Production, employment and wages are lower with rigid labor markets than with
exible labor markets. However, it is important to remark that the equilibrium with
exible labor markets does not necessarily Pareto-dominate the equilibrium with rigid
labor markets. Actually, the equilibrium with rigid labor markets and strong family ties
dominates if (1) > 1  (1 c)2
2
, since the expected utility is (1)+ (1 c)
2
2
in the equilibrium
with strong family ties and 1 in the equilibrium with weak family ties. Otherwise, the
equilibrium with weak family ties yields higher welfare. Accordingly, the economy can be
coordinated on an equilibrium with too rigid labor markets, when (1) < 1  (1 c)2
2
, but
also on an equilibrium with too exible labor markets, when (1) > 1  (1 c)2
2
: As shown
in Figure 2, it turns out that labor market regulation is the preferred equilibrium if the
valuation of strong family ties when everyone has strong family ties, (1), is high relative
to c; the cost of labor market regulation.
A slightly di¤erent way of rephrasing this result is that in countries or historical
periods when family ties can bring about great gains then the benets of family ties may
compensate for the loss of e¢ ciency caused by labor market regulations.
2.4 The dynamics of family values
Following the seminal papers by Bisin and Verdier (2000, 2001), we assume that pater-
nalistic parents wish to transmit their own values to their children. Suppose that each
individual lives for one period, has one child, and has payo¤s as before. Her child inherits
her family values with probability p > 1=2 and is free to choose her family values with
probability 1 p. As it will be clear below, p > 1=2 ensures that the transmission of family
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ties inuences the dynamics of labor market regulation. When p  1=2; the stickiness
in the transmission of family ties is not su¢ cient to inuence the choice of labor market
regulation.
The sequence of events outlined above is now repeated in each period with an innite
horizon, with the only change being that only a fraction 1  p of the population chooses
family values; a fraction pt 1 is constrained to have strong family ties and a fraction
p (1  t 1) to have weak family ties. In other words we add some stickiness to the
transmission of family ties. Not everyone can freely choose a set of family ties every
generation.
 If 0 > 1=2p; the share of individuals with strong family ties is necessarily larger
than 1/2 in period 1. Then, the median voter chooses to regulate the labor market
and every individual is better o¤ with strong family ties. Since there are at least
p(1 0) individuals with weak family ties in period 1, the share of individuals with
strong family ties in period 1 is
1 = 1  p(1  0) > 1=2:
Then, in periods t  1; the labor market is regulated and the share of individuals
with strong family ties
t = 1  pt(1  0):
converges to one when t goes to innity.
 If 0 < 1  (1=2p); the same type of reasoning shows that the economy has a exible
labor market in period t > 0 and that
t = 0p
t;
converges to zero when t goes to innity.
 If 0 2 [1=2p; 1  (1=2p)] ; there are two possible equilibria in periods t > 0 as
far as t 1 remains in the interval [1=2p; 1  (1=2p)] : If t 1 does not belong to this
interval, the dynamics of  after date t is described by one of the two cases described
above.
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This simple analysis shows how societies starting with a large share of individuals with
strong family ties have strong labor market regulations, whereas societies starting with
weak family ties have exible labor markets. This analysis shows a two way interaction
between culture and institutions.
3 Family ties and labor market regulation: cross coun-
try evidence
Our model predicts a two way relationship between family values and labor market reg-
ulation. Testing a multiple equilibrium model is very hard, as one would need to have
exogenous variation in labor market institutions and family values. In our empirical part
we try however to establish few important facts. First, we show that it exists a strong
correlation between family values and labor market regulation, that is not driven by other
country characteristics. We motivate our analysis by documenting a strong correlation
between the strength of family relationships and labor market regulations (and also de-
sire for regulations) across countries. We then analyze economic outcomes and attitudes
toward regulation of children of immigrants to further limit the possibility that our re-
sults are driven by omitted variables. In the last section we go one step further and try
to isolate one part of the feedback e¤ect: the one going from cultural values to labor
market regulation. We do so by documenting a strong correlation between the structure
of the family in the Middle Ages and current desire for regulation today. In addition,
we show that values inherited by children of immigrant prior to 1940 (therefore before
the establishment of actual labor market regulations) are relevant in shaping institutions
today. Although we are able to establish a strong link between cultural values and labor
market regulations, our last piece of evidence is an indication that cultural values are
more primitive than labor market institutions or denitely more slow moving.
3.1 Data
3.1.1 Family ties
We measure the strength of family ties by using a series of objective and subjective
measures of family ties. We use two main data sources: theWorld Values Survey (WVS)
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and the Survey of Health, Ageing and Retirement in Europe (SHARE).
The WVS is an international social survey of four waves 1981-84, 1990-93, 1995 and
1999-2003, denoted henceforth 1980, 1990, 1995 and 2000. This survey provides, among
other things, a wide range of subjective indicators on the relationship between parents
and children and, as an objective measure of family attachment, whether the individual
lives with his/her parents. We measure family strength using the following ve measures:
i) living with parents: the question is an objective indicator of family strength and
measures whether a young adult is living at home with his/her parents. Reher (1998) in
studying di¤erences between weak and strong family ties in Europe indeed claims that
"the strength and weakness refers to cultural patterns of family loyalties, allegiances, and
authorities which are reected in demographic patterns of coresidence with adult children
and older family members".
ii) respect parents: the question probes whether the respondent agrees with one of
the two statements (taking the values of 1 and 2 respectively): 1) regardless of what the
qualities and faults of ones parents are, one must always love and respect them; 2) one
does not have the duty to respect and love parents who have not earned it.
iii) make parents proud: the question asks the respondents to agree or disagree (on a
scale from 1, agree strongly, to 4, strongly disagree) with the following statement: one of
the main goals in life has been to make my parents proud.
iv) parents responsibility: the question investigates whether the respondent agrees
with one of the two statements (taking the value of 1 and 2 respectively): 1) It is the
parentsduty to do their best for their children even at the expense of their own well
being, 2) Parents have a life on their own.
v) obey parents: the question asks whether obedience is an important quality for
children and can take the value of 1 if it is indeed important and 0 if it is not.
vi) family important: this question assesses how important the family is in one persons
life and can take values from 1 to 4 (with 1 being very important and 4 not important at
all).
We recode all the questions so that a higher number implies a stronger attachment
to the family and collapse the data at the country level to be able to correlate them to
measures of labor market regulations across countries.
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The SHARE database is a cross-national database that provides micro data on health,
socio-economic status and the social and family network of individuals, aged 50 or over,
for 14 European countries.17 For our purposes, the SHARE survey has the advantage of
collecting detailed information on child-parent geographic proximity. From this survey
we constructed three di¤erent indicators of family attachment at the country level:18 the
rst indicator measures the fraction of adult children (older than 24), who live 5 Km or
closer to their family. The second indicator measures the average age at which the young
adult left home, and the third indicator measures the frequency of contacts parents have
with their children (this variable, increasing with frequency, is coded on a scale from 1
(never) to 7 (daily))19.
3.1.2 Labor market regulation and desire for labor market regulation
We focus on the labor market institutions analyzed in the model: ring costs and the
stringency of the minimum wage regulation. Firing costs are measured using the index
of the World Bank for the year 2004 (see Botero et al., 2004). This index measures these
costs in terms of weeks of salary. It is based on three components: i) the notice period
for redundancy dismissal after 20 years of continuous employment, ii) the severance pay
for redundancy dismissal after 20 years of employment and iii) the legally mandated
penalty for redundancy dismissal. We mainly focus on this indicator because it covers
much more countries than the OECD employment protection index, and it displays more
heterogeneity than the World Bank indicator of the di¢ culty of ring. The index can
take values from 0 to 200. For robustness checks, we also consider the OECD employment
protection index. We take the most recent indicator in 2008, covering 33 countries for
which we have observations on family ties. The recent trends in labor market regulations
are that countries with more rigid labor markets have introduced some exibility for
particular population groups. The question of why some countries impose a more rigid
17This paper uses the second release of the 2006 wave, which includes the following countries: Austria,
Belgium, Czech Republic, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Poland, Spain,
Sweden, Switzerland.
18We constructed the indicator using the information on the rst child; the survey also reports infor-
mation for the other children. The results remain valid when we look at the second or third child or an
average of all the children.
19The variable can take the following values: never (1), less than once a month (2), about once a month
(3), about every two weeks (4), about once a week (5), several times a week (6), daily (7).
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regulation for some groups than on others is beyond the scope of this article. But we
check that the legislation on temporary contracts is still more stringent in countries with
stronger family ties than in countries with weak family ties. The indices on regular
contracts and temporary contracts ranges from 0 for the least stringent regulation to 6
for the most restrictive legislation. The index on temporary contracts covers both xed
term contracts and all other kinds of short term contracts.
The stringency of the minimum wage regulation is measured through a composite
index constructed by the ILO.20 The index combines information i) on the level of the
minimumwage and ii) on the existence of legal minimumwages and the extent of potential
derogation. The index refers to the year 2006. The rst component of the index, the level
of the wage oor, is measured as the monthly minimum wage expressed in US dollars.
To make this measure comparable across countries, we calculate the share of the monthly
minimum wage as a function of per capita income in 2006. Income per capita is taken
from the World Bank. The second component of the index measures the stringency of the
minimum wage legislation, that is the extent to which the state directly regulates by law
the labor market instead of letting social partners negotiate. This component can take
the following values:
 1 if there is a legal statutory minimum wage and if the minimum wage is set at the
national level without any derogation.
 0.5 if there is a legal statutory minimum wage but with derogations by age, quali-
cation, region, sector or occupation; or if the wage oor is set by collective bargaining
but extended to all workers.
 0 if the wage is set by collective bargaining and only applies to the unionized workers.
The overall index is the product of these two components.
We measure the desire for labor market regulation aggregating at the country level
the following two subjective measures. First, for the demand for job security we use the
following question in the four waves of the WVS Here are some more aspects of a job
that people say are important. Please look at them and tell me which ones you personally
20This index is described more precisely in Aghion, Algan and Cahuc (2011).
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think are important in a job?: Good Job Security. The answers take on the value 1 if
job security is mentioned and zero otherwise. Second, for wage regulation we use the
International Social Survey Program. The ISSP is a compilation of surveys, covering all
OECD and Eastern European countries, devoted each year to di¤erent specic topics such
as religion, social networks or the role of government. A specic ISSP survey on The role
of governmentwas carried out in 1996, providing a specic question on the regulation
of wages: Here is a list of potential government actions for the economy: Control wages
by law?. The answers can take on values from 1, strongly agree, to 4, strongly disagree.
To ease the interpretation we recode the question as a dummy taking the value of 1 if
the respondent (strongly) agrees and 0 if he/she (strongly) disagrees. The results remain
unchanged with the original coding.
3.2 Cross country correlations
Figures 3 shows the positive cross-country correlation between the two measures of labor
market regulation (ring costs and the minimum wage) and the objective indicator of fam-
ily ties, measured by the fraction of young adults living in the parental home.21 Countries
with strong family ties tend to have higher ring costs and also more stringent regulation
of the minimum wage. Figure 3 bis shows the relationship between family ties and the
alternative OECD index of employment protection, distinguishing between regular and
temporary contracts. We nd the same correlation pattern. The cross-country correla-
tion between the legislations on temporary and on regular contracts is modest, reaching
0.388. But we nd that OECD countries with strong family ties, in particular in Southern
European countries, have also more stringent legislation on temporary contracts.
Figure 4 shows the relationship between desire for regulation (demand for wage and
job security) and the strength of family ties. The correlation between those labor market
institutions and the demand for those types of regulation is substantial, suggesting to
probe into the determinants of the demand for regulation.
In the Appendix (Table B2) we report the correlations with additional controls. We
include legal origin, which is the traditional alternative theory to explain regulation and
21We do the cross-country analysis using the objective measures of family ties. The results with the
subjective measures are very similar and are available from the authors. The correlations between the
di¤erent measures of family ties are very strong and are reported in Table 1.
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its economic consequences (see Botero et al., 2004; or Laporta et al., 2008). We also
include the (ln)-country average population over the period 1980-2000 (taken from the
World Bank). As stressed by Mulligan and Shleifer (1995), the population density might
be crucial to explain the supply of regulation. The relationship between labor market
regulation or desire for regulation and family ties remains positive and statistically sig-
nicant at the 1 or 5 percent level. The only relationship that is no longer statistically
signicant is with the demand for wage regulation, but this is most likely due to the low
number of observations. The economic impact of family ties is sizeable. A one standard
deviation increase in the strength of family ties (0.104) is associated with a 10.4 percent
increase in ring costs (equal to 22 percent of the sample mean of the ring cost variable).
A one standard deviation increase in the strength of family ties also explain 17 percent
of the sample mean of the minimum wage variable and 9 percent of the sample mean of
the demand for job security22.
In Figures 5 and 6, we show the correlations between labor market regulation (and
desire for labor market regulation) and the three additional objective measures of family
attachment constructed from the SHARE survey. The picture found with these additional
measures is very consistent with our previous ndings: countries with strong family ties
demand and choose more regulated labor market institutions.
4 Evidence from immigrants in the United States
Cross-country correlations are only illustrative because omitted variables and reverse
causality may inuence the relationship we are interested in. The omitted variable prob-
lem is obvious: many other variables besides family ties may explain di¤erences in labor
market institutions across countries. In order to avoid this problem one could look at
within country evidence comparing preferences for labor market regulation at the indi-
vidual level (i.e. running individual level regressions with country xed e¤ects). However
even this empirical strategy su¤ers from a problem of reverse causality. For instance
22Table B2 bis shows the results with the OECD employment protection indexes. We report the
results for temporary and regular contracts and also for the global index (an average of the two types
of legislations weighted by the share of workers covered by each contract.) We still nd a statistically
signicant correlation with family ties, at the 10 percent level though, but the number of observations is
reduced by half when the sample includes OECD countries only.
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somebody with low productivity and unwilling to move because of "laziness" may justify
to himself/herself (and/or to the interviewer) his/her lack of e¤ort with an attachment to
his/her family and a desire to stay home.
We address both concerns by looking at immigrants in the US. We associate to each
immigrant the family values of his/her country of origin, as measured by objective and
subjective measures of family ties in the World Value Survey. Family values attributed
to any immigrant are those of the country of origin and not those that he/she expresses
(and that therefore could be caused by his/her special circumstances.) We look at second
generation immigrants (individuals who are born and raised in the US), because problems
of disruption and selection due to immigration are more limited compared to the rst gen-
eration (those who actually moved.) We provide evidence on both immigrantsoutcomes
(unemployment, mobility and wages) and their desire for labor market regulation. We
show that immigrants coming from more familistic societies are less mobile, face a wage
and employment penalty and also ask for more government regulation of wages and job
security.23 The results hold not only when we use the objective measure of family ties but
also the ve di¤erent subjective measures calculated from the World Values Survey.
The benet of this exercise is that we are holding constant the external environment,
while examining individuals from diverse cultural backgrounds. One shortcoming is that
the children of immigrants are not a random sample of the full population in the home
country. Therefore, the results should be understood with this in mind: they are an
average e¤ect of the sample we consider. It is worth notice, however, that in this specic
case the results should be biased against us: individuals coming from weak family ties are
indi¤erent between staying in the country of origin and leaving, but for people coming
from strong family ties countries those who left should be less attached to the family. As
a result, we should see less variation among immigrants and as such our estimates most
likely constitute a lower bound of the e¤ect of family values on labor market outcomes.
Another shortcoming of the analysis is that if immigrants and their children tend to
live in locations with many co-ethnics, then it is possible that informal institutions may
23The use of immigrants (rst or second generation) to study the importance of culture on economic
behavior is becoming relatively standard in the analysis of culture. See Alesina and Giuliano (2010),
Algan and Cahuc (2005, 2009), Antecol (2000), Carroll, Rhee and Rhee (1994), Fernandez and Fogli
(2006,2009), Giuliano (2007) and Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales (2006) among others.
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be recreated in these areas, explaining some of the persistence. The results should be
understood with this possibility in mind.
4.1 Data and empirical specication
We use two main datasets: the March Supplement of the Current Population Survey
to study immigrantseconomic outcomes and the General Social Survey (GSS) to study
immigrantsattitudes towards labor market regulation.
4.1.1 March Supplement of the Current Population Survey: 1994-2012
The March Supplement of the Current Population Survey (CPS) is the only recent avail-
able dataset in which individuals were asked (starting from 1994) about their parents
country of origin.24 We dene second generation immigrants by looking at the country
of origin of fathersrespondent in order to maximize the number of observations.25 We
pool nineteen years of data, from 1994 to 2012, to have a higher number of observations.
We use the CPS to study the following outcomes predicted by the model: geographical
mobility, unemployment and wages. In the CPS we do have data on almost all countries
covered in the World Values Survey.26 Descriptive statistics are provided in Table B1.
4.1.2 General Social Survey: 1972-2010
The General Social Survey (GSS) covers the period 1972-2010 and provides information
on the place of birth and the country of origin of the respondents forbearers since 1977.
The GSS variable for the country of origin reads as follows: From what countries or
part of the world did your ancestors come?. The individual can report up to three
countries of origin by order of preference. Two respondents out of three report only one
country of origin. We select the GSS ethnic variable that captures the country of origin
24The Census reports the information about the fathers country of origin until 1970.
25The CPS also reports the country of origin of the mother, but the sample size would be smaller due
to a much higher number of missing observations.
26The CPS has data on second generation individuals from the following countries of origin: Puerto
Rico, Canada, Mexico, El Salvador, Dominican Republic, Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Peru,
Uruguay, Venezuela, Finland, Norway, Sweden, England, Ireland, Northn Ireland, Belgium, France,
Netherlands, Switzerland, Greece, Italy, Portugal, Spain, Austria, Slovakia, Czech Republic, Germany,
Hungary, Poland, Yugoslavia, Latvia, Lithuania, Tussia, Ukraine, China, Taiwan, Japan, South Korea,
Indonesia, Philippines, Singapore, Vietnam, India, Bangladesh, Pakistan, Iran, Jordan, Turkey, Egypt,
Morocco, Nigeria, South Africa, Australia and New Zealand.
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to which the respondent feels the closest to make the comparison between countries of
origin interpretable. To maximize the number of observations we combine all generations,
therefore we dene an immigrant as a person with at least one ancestor (parent or grand
parents) born abroad. The descriptive statistics are reported in Table B1 in the Appendix.
The GSS provides specic questions related to attitudes towards job security and
regulation. Preferences for job security are measured by the question: Would you please
look at this card and tell me which one thing on this list you would most prefer in a
job? No danger of being red. The answer is ranked from 1, for the most important
characteristic, to 5 for the last important. Attitudes toward regulation of jobs and wages
are given by the following two questions: Here are some things the government might do
for the economy: Supporting declining industries to protect jobs". Here are some things
the government might do for the economy: Regulate wages. The answers range from 1
for strongly agree, 2 for agree, 3 for neither, 4 for disagree to 5 for strongly disagree. We
recode all the questions so that a higher number is associated with a higher desire for
regulation.
4.1.3 Empirical Specication
For both attitudes and labor market outcomes, we run the following OLS or probit (de-
pending on the nature of the left hand side variable) regressions:
Yic = 0 + 1family_tiesc + 2Xi + s + "ic
where Yic is our variable of interest for an immigrant i whose forbearer was born in country
c. Xi are individual controls, which vary according to the nature of the left hand side
variable, and family_tiesc are di¤erent measures of family ties calculated from the WVS
in the country of origin. We also control for a full set of US state dummies27. All standard
errors are clustered at the country of origin level.
27When we use the GSS we include region xed e¤ects, since the information about the state of residence
is not available in the publicly available version.
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4.2 Results
4.2.1 Evidence on labor market outcomes
We start by analyzing the impact of country of origin family ties on labor market outcomes
of second generation immigrants. Tables 2 to 4 report the evidence obtained with the CPS
for the following labor market outcomes: mobility, unemployment and log real hourly
wages. Mobility is dened as a dummy equal to 1 if the individual moved from/in a
di¤erent state, or abroad in the last ve years. Unemployed is a dummy equal to 1 if the
person is unemployed. Log hourly wage is dened as total wage income divided by the
number of hours worked in a year, and corrected for ination28.
We regress each outcome on the di¤erent measures of family ties. The mobility regres-
sion (Table 2) controls for education, marital and employment status, real family income,
number of children in the household, in addition to gender, race and a quadratic term for
age. The standard errors are clustered at the country of origin level. Our specication
also includes state dummies to take into account local labor market characteristics of
the area where immigrants live that could drive the results. Although we do not report
them explicitly in here, we nd that the estimated coe¢ cients for the control variables
are generally as expected.29 In particular unemployed individuals are more likely to move
(presumably searching for jobs). Less educated people are less mobile and higher income
tends to discourage mobility, controlling for education. Married people tend to move less,
similarly to women (although the gender e¤ect is not signicant). The results are signif-
icant and with the expected sign for each measure of family values: individuals coming
from countries with stronger family ties, display lower mobility.
Table 3 reports the results for the probability of being unemployed. We nd that the
probability of being unemployed is indeed substantially higher30 for immigrants coming
from countries with stronger family ties.31 Thus, looking at Tables 2 and 3, the picture
28The CPS has information on both the number of weeks worked in a year and the number of hours
usually worked in a week. When correcting for ination we use as base year the CPI 1994.
29The estimates for the controls are available upon request.
30We do not nd a signicant e¤ect on the variable indicating the fraction of people living at home in
the country of origin. Note that this variable is however signicant when we look at the probability of
being unemployed for second generation immigrants in the Census 1940, 1960 and 1970. The results are
reported in Tables B20-B22 of Appendix B.
31This result is also in line with Bentolila and Ichino (2008), who nd that the losses associated with
unemployment are much lower in Mediterranean societies with strong family ties, as the family provides
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seems to be consistent with the model: with stronger family ties people are less willing
to move to nd jobs.
Table 4 reports a standardMincer wage regression where log hourly wages are regressed
on education and a quadratic in potential experience (dened as age minus number of years
of education minus six). We also control for marital status and gender. Higher experience
increases wages, as expected, together with education. Single people and women tend to
have lower wages. All the di¤erent measures of family values have a signicant e¤ect on
wages: second generation immigrants coming from familistic countries have lower wages
as predicted by our model.
In terms of magnitude of the results, we can easily compute the impact of a one
standard deviation increase in di¤erent measures of family ties: for example, for the
mobility equation, an increase in one standard deviation of the variable "living with
parents" leads to a decline of 0.002 of the mobility variable, which is equivalent to 6
percent of the average of this variable. The results for the other family values variables
are very similar and can explain between 4 and 10 percent of the mean of the mobility
variable. The e¤ects of the family variables from the country of origin are of comparable
magnitude for the unemployment variable and a bit smaller for wages (this could be due
to the fact that since individuals do not move to stay close to their families they might
decide to invest less in education to start with and have lower wages as a result).
4.2.2 Evidence on attitudes toward labor market regulation
We then look at the implication of inherited family values on the demand for regulation
(Tables 5-8). In Table 5-7 we use the three questions from the GSS described above. Each
regression controls for a quadratic in age, years of education, gender, income, employment
and marital status, number of children and region xed e¤ects.32 Standard errors are
clustered at the country of origin level. The results are highly consistent with the previous
cross-country estimates. US immigrants coming from strong family ties countries tend to
consider job security as a more important characteristic for a job. They are also more
likely to believe that the government should save jobs or directly intervene to regulate
wages. The e¤ects are statistically signicant and economically sizeable. A one standard
insurance.
32The publicly available version of the GSS provide only the region of residence as geographic identier.
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deviation increase in the fraction of adult population living at home in the country of
origin can explain 5 percent of the sample average of all the three di¤erent measures of
desire for regulation. The e¤ect is of sizable magnitude when compared to variables such
as income or education. An increase in one standard deviation in the years of education
can explain 10 percent of the sample average of the desire for regulation.
Table 8 reports the estimated average e¤ect size (AES) for the three measures of
regulation examined in Tables 5-7. We computed the AES following Kling, Liebman,
Katz and Sanbonmatsu (2004). Let k indicate the estimated family ties coe¢ cient for
outcome variable k and k the standard deviation of outcome k. Then, the average
e¤ect size is equal to 1
K
PK
k=1
k
k
, where K is the total number of outcome variables. To
properly calculate the sample variance of the AES, the coe¢ cient k are jointly estimated
in a seemingly unrelated regression framework.33 The AES estimates conrm the nding
when examining the attitudes toward regulation separately: coming from a country where
family ties are very strong is associated with more desire for labor market regulation
among immigrants. The results are always signicant at the 1 percent level, independently
of the measure of family ties in the country of origin used.
4.2.3 Robustness checks
A potential concern with the estimates reported up to this point is that the measures of
family ties are capturing some other country of origin characteristics (migrants coming
from poorer countries or with a lower level of human capital could have a higher level
of unemployment or lower wages for example). We test for the possibility of omitted
variables by controlling for various country of origin characteristics in both the CPS and
GSS estimates: in particular we include the level of GDP per capita (Tables B3-B6) and
the level of human capital (Tables B7-B11)34, as measured by the average number of years
of education (Barro-Lee (2010)). In order to take into account di¤erences in ancestors
human capital, we include a measure of "ethnic human capital", given by the average
education of the immigrant group to which each second generation immigrant belongs
33See Clingingsmith, Khwaja and Kremer (2009) for an alternative application and further details.
34The General Social Survey contains information on the level of education of the parents. We can
therefore also control directly for this variable in our regressions. The results (reported in Table B11) are
robust to the inclusion of parental human capital, despite the much smaller sample size.
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(Tables B12-B15). To construct this measure we use the 1970 census and calculate the
average years of education for all individuals who are in between the ages of 25 and 44
and who were born in one of the countries of origin in our sample. We select individuals in
this age range as this roughly corresponds to the age interval in which we would nd the
parents of individuals in our sample. The inclusion of other cross-country characteristics
does not modify the relevance of family values on labor market outcomes and attitudes
of second generation immigrants.
As a second robustness check, we test whether family values are more robustly related
to labor market outcomes or attitudes than another more commonly used cultural variable,
the level of trust in a country (Tables B16-B19). Knack and Keefer (1997) have found
for example a positive correlation between trust and economic development. One may
worry that the cross-country di¤erences in family values are simply picking up on cross-
country di¤erences in the level of trust. We measure trust using the following question
in the World Values Survey: "Generally speaking, would you say that most people can
be trusted or that most people cannot be trusted?". Our results survive the inclusion of
trust as an alternative cultural value.
As a third check, we test the robustness of our results to the use of di¤erent samples.
For the labor market outcomes, we have used the Current Population Survey, since this
dataset is the closest in time to the data on family ties taken from the World Values
Survey. We check if the results also hold when we use evidence from previous Censuses of
1940, 1960 and 1970 (Tables B20-B22).35 We run the regressions under the assumption
that family values observed today have been fairly stable over time, so we assume that
they did not change in the last 70 years or so. Our results are remarkably consistent
with those found using the Current Population Survey: today as well as 70 years ago,
immigrants coming from strong family ties societies tend to have lower mobility rates,
lower wages and a higher level of unemployment.
If di¤erences in cultural values regarding the role of the family are relevant in ex-
plaining labor market outcomes one would expect a stronger e¤ect if both parents come
from the same country: norms are more likely to be transmitted if parents share the
same cultural origin. We test whether this is the case by restricting the sample to second
35The Census 1950 does not contain the variable on geographical mobility.
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generation immigrants whose parents came from the same country (Tables B23-B25). We
indeed nd that the coe¢ cients are more precisely estimated and larger in magnitudes36.
5 Persistence
One of the basic messages of the present paper is that labor market institutions depend
upon deeply rooted cultural values, like family ties. Thus labor market institutions are
persistent to the extent that family values are fairly constant over time. In this section
we present evidence showing that indeed family values do not change quickly. We do so in
two ways. First, we show that the strength of family ties inherited from countries of origin
before 1940 is correlated with the stringency of labor market regulation in the countries of
origin at the beginning of the 21st century. Second, we exploit di¤erences in family types
across European regions dating back to the Middle Ages, by using the classication by
Todd (1990). We match historical family types with current individual family structures
to show a strong persistence between family structures in the Middle Ages and family
structures today. We also link historical family types to the demand for job regulation
using the regional variation provided by Todd. We nd strong evidence of persistence
between historical family structures and current family structures, and between historical
family structures and the demand for regulation. We cannot link immigrantsoutcomes
and preferences to the medieval classication of Todd, because the CPS and the GSS do
not report region of origin of the immigrants.
5.1 Values inherited before 1940 and 21st century institutions
In this section, we investigate the persistence of family values and their long lasting impact
on labor market regulations, by showing that attitudes toward the family of immigrants
arrived in the US before 1940 are related to labor market regulations in the country of
origin at the beginning of the twenty rst century. We focus on family values before World
War II since the main labor market institutions have been implemented in the post-war
period.
The strength of family ties before World War II cannot be observed directly, since
36This exercise can be done only using the CPS. The Census contains information only about the
country of origin of the father. The GSS asks to indicate only one country of ancestry.
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there is no survey available on this period. To track back historical values of family ties
in di¤erent countries, we follow Algan and Cahuc (2010) methodology by estimating the
inherited component of family values. More precisely, we estimate the family values that
US immigrants have inherited from their forbears who migrated from di¤erent countries.
To reconstruct those family values before World War II, we focus on U.S. immigrants
whose ancestors arrived in the U.S. before 1940. The estimation of inherited family
values is based on the GSS, which provides information on contemporaneous family values
of US descendants of immigrants and the wave of immigration. To measure inherited
family values, we run OLS regression of family values reported in the GSS on countries of
origin xed e¤ects, in addition to individual characteristics. The inherited family values
correspond to the coe¢ cients of country of origin xed e¤ects.37
The GSS does not contain the same variables on family ties as those of the World
Values Survey. To measure the strength of family ties we use the following variable:
How often do you spend a social evening with relatives?. The respondent can answer:
"almost every day, once or twice a week, several times a month, about once a month,
several times a year, about once a year, never. The answer has been coded from 1 to 7
so that a higher frequency of meetings with relatives corresponds to stronger family ties".
Figure 7 shows the correlation between the inherited family ties from the countries
of origin before 1940 and the current family ties in the home countries. The strength of
family ties for immigrants arrived before 1940 corresponds to the country of origin xed
e¤ects in the microregressions on family ties in the GSS. The current family ties in the
home country correspond to the share of adults still living in the parental house from
the WVS. The correlation is rather steady and equal to 0.48, showing that there is a
strong inertia in family values across countries. In the appendix (Table B26) we show
additional regressions documenting the strong correlations between reported family values
in the GSS and home country family values based on the various measures from the WVS.
Independently of how family ties are measured the correlations are very strong. This is
a reassuring test for our empirical strategy and an additional conrmation of cultural
37The sample is made up of US immigrants whose ancestors migrated before 1940. If we assume a
gap of 25 years between generations, this include the following sample of US immigrants: i) second
generation immigrants born before 1940, since their parents immigrated in the U.S. before 1940; ii) third
generation immigrants born before 1965, since their grand parents arrived in the U.S. before 1940; iii)
fourth generation immigrants born before 1990.
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transmission of family values across generations.
We next discuss the correlation between inherited family ties and current labor mar-
ket legislations in the home countries. Table 9 shows the OLS estimations controlling for
legal origin and population density. The correlation between ring costs in the 2000s and
family values prior to 1940 is statistically signicant at the 5 percent level. The corre-
lation between the minimum wage legislation and past family values is also statistically
signicant at the 5 percent level. In contrast, neither legal origins nor population den-
sity are statistically signicantly correlated with the regulation of labor when we include
inherited family values. Moreover, the coe¢ cients associated with past family values are
of the same order of magnitude as the ones found with contemporaneous family values in
Table B2, suggesting the long lasting e¤ect of family ties on the design of labor market
regulation.
5.2 Medieval family structures and current desire for labor mar-
ket regulation
In this section we make a step further by suggesting that family values may be persistent
over centuries not only decades. We document a correlation between medieval family
structures and current family arrangements. In addition, we also show that medieval
family structures are related to current desire for regulation. To do so, we use Todds
(1990) classication of medieval families, which is particularly appealing since it provides
regional variation in the structure of the family. By linking the regional variation in
family structures to individual desire for regulation, we further prove that the desire for
regulation is not driven by other omitted cross country characteristics, since we will be
able to control for country xed e¤ects.
Todd (1990) provides a characterization of family types along two dimensions. The
rst one refers to the vertical relationship between parents and children. The relationship
is said to be liberal if children become independent from their parents at an early
age and leave their parental home as soon as they get married. The relationship is said
to be authoritarian if children continue to depend on their parents in adult age and
still live with them after marrying. The second principle of organization of the family is
the horizontal relationship between siblings, based on inheritance laws or practices. The
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relationship is egalitarian if siblings receive roughly an equal share of the family wealth
after parentsdeath. On the other hand, the relationship is not egalitarian when the
parents can favor one o¤spring at the expense of the others and transmits family wealth
to a single targeted child only.
The combination of these four di¤erent patterns of family organization leads to dene
four family types. The absolute nuclear family, characterized by a liberal relationship
between parents and children and by unequal inheritance rules. In this context, chil-
dren become totally independent from their parents when they become adult and form
single families with one couple and their children. The egalitarian nuclear family, with
liberal relationship between parents and children and egalitarian inheritance rules among
the children. According to Todd, this family type encourages stronger relations between
the family members than the absolute nuclear family, at least until parentsdeath. The
presence of egalitarian inheritance rules therefore encourages the co-residence of di¤erent
generations, despite the liberal relationship between parents and children. The extended
family, characterized by an authoritarian vertical relationship and an inegalitarian hor-
izontal relationship between the siblings. The household consists of extended families,
where the eldest child and his family stay in the parental home and inherit the family
wealth, while the other children remain in the parental home only until they get mar-
ried.38 The fourth type is the communitarian family, with both authoritarian vertical
relationship and egalitarian inheritance rules between the sons. This type consists of
large extended families, with all sons living with their wives in the parental house.39
For the case of Europe, Todd provides data at the regional level. There is a signicant
heterogeneity in family types across European countries. Figure 8 in Appendix shows
the di¤erent family types at the regional level, using the original Todds classication.40
Absolute nuclear families are more widespread in England, while in Southern European
38Todd refers to the extended family as stem family. He also refers to the imcomplete stem family, the
same as the stem family but with more egalitarian inheritance rules (in principle but rarely in practice).
We group together the complete and incomplete stem families in our quantitative analysis.
39Todds family classication is based on historical monographies dating back to the Middle Ages,
in di¤erent regions of Western European countries. These monographies were collected by the church
or di¤erent legal powers to track their local population and levy taxes. Todd combined these historical
monographies with census data in the 1950s and found a very strong persistence of the family arrangement
across European regions since the Middle Ages.
40See Todd (1990) and Duranton et al. (2009) for a detailed presentation of the regional variation for
Europe.
29
countries, families are egalitarian nuclear, extended or communitarian. There is a fair
amount of heterogeneity within the same country. In Northern countries like Denmark,
Norway or Ireland, we see a division between nuclear egalitarian and extended families. In
France, the region Ile de France and the North have egalitarian nuclear families, the West
and the East are mainly populated by extended families, whereas communitarian families
are the predominant family structures in the South East. The same heterogeneity is at
work in countries like Spain, Portugal, Italy, Switzerland or Germany. Todd suggests that
the long-term persistence of these family types could explain key economic outcomes such
as the European industrial revolutions or the current economic development of regions.41
We complement the analyses of Todd (1990) and Duranton et al. (2009) by looking
at the relationship between family types in the Middle Ages and the demand for job pro-
tection at end of the 20th century; we also look at the correlation between current family
arrangements and medieval family structures using individual data from the World Values
Survey. We match Todds European classication of family types with the European coun-
tries of the World Values Survey and the International Social Survey Program (ISSP)42
datasets at the regional level. Note that Todds data are available only on a map and the
region he used do not necessarily correspond to the regional classication reported in the
World Value Survey or the ISSP. For that reason we did a country by country adjustment
overlaying Todds original map with the classication of the WVS and ISSP.
We rst document a correlation between the probability that an individual lives at their
parentshome and medieval family structures. As outlined above, with the exception of
absolute nuclear families, all the other family structures were favouring the cohabitation
of parents and children. From the WVS, we also look at a question on the preference
for job security: Here are some more aspects of a job that people say are important.
Please look at them and tell me which ones you personally think are important in a
job?: Good Job Security?The answers take on the value 1 if job security is mentioned
and zero otherwise. We then consider a question taken from the ISSP on labor market
regulation. In particular the question is: Here is a list of potential government actions
41See Duranton et al. (2009) for details.
42The ISSP is a compilation of surveys, covering all OECD and Eastern European countries, devoted
each year to di¤erent specic topics such as religion, social networks or the role of government. A specic
ISSP survey on The role of governmentwas carried out in 1996.
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for the economy: Help Declining Industries and Protect Jobsand it is coded on a scale
from 1 (strongly agree) to 4 (strongly disagree). The question is recoded so that a higher
number means more regulation.
Table 10 (column 1) shows the correlation between Todds family classication and
the probability for a young adult to live at home with parents. We identify the relation
across regions by including country xed e¤ects, while still controlling for individual char-
acteristics. Controls included in the regression are gender, a quadratic in age, education,
income, unemployment status, political orientation, religious denomination and country
xed e¤ects. We include one dummy for each family type: absolute nuclear, egalitarian
nuclear, extended and communitarian. Absolute nuclear family is the reference group.
We nd that the probability that individuals live with their parents in signicantly higher
in regions where the absolute nuclear family was not the dominant type in the Middle
Ages. This is consistent with Todd (1990) and also Duranton et al. (2009). The latter
study the correlation with average household size in 2000, measured as the number of
individuals per household.
As a second step, we look at the relationship between medieval family structure and
the contemporaneous desire for regulation (columns 2 and 3). Individuals coming from
extended or communitarian family regions tend to be more pro job security than indi-
viduals from nuclear family. The e¤ect of extended family and communitarian family on
the demand for job security is statistically signicant at the 5 percent level, while the
relationship with nuclear family is not. Column 3 shows that individuals coming from
regions where the family structure was prevalently communitarian also tend to be more
supportive of government intervention than individuals coming from nuclear family. The
results are statistically signicant at the 5 percent level.
Overall all these results are in line with the prediction of the model according to which
family values have persistent e¤ects on labor market regulation if the intergenerational
transmission of family values is su¢ ciently strong. Labor market regulations seem to
have deep cultural roots since labor market rigidities at the beginning of the twenty rst
century are correlated with family values prevailing before WWII. We also nd evidence
of persistence not only between family structures in the Middle Ages and today, but also
between medieval family structure and desire for labor market regulation today.
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6 Conclusions
Labor market deregulation requires geographical mobility, otherwise rms can take ad-
vantage of the immobility of workers and extract rents. However, geographical mobility
requires relatively weak family ties. That is, individuals should not experience a too high
utility loss if they need to move away from their family of origin. Such costs may, instead,
be high in cultures that value family ties, and therefore family closeness. As a result
countries with strong family ties rationally favor a host of labor market regulations, in
order to restrict the monopsony power of rms. Family values may evolve over time,
although slowly. In places with laissez-faire labor markets, parents have an incentive to
teach children the benets of mobility. In countries with regulated labor markets, the
benet of mobility are much lower and parents can, if they choose to do so, teach the
value of family ties, since they come at lower or no costs. Thus we can have two equilibria
with a two way causality between family ties and labor market regulation.
We investigate this correlation between family values and attitudes toward labor mar-
ket regulation and preferences for job security versus free labor market with cross country
evidence, individual level evidence drawn from immigrants in the US, together with ev-
idence about persistence in family structures going back to the Medieval period. In all
cases we found rather strong conrmation of a correlation between labor market institu-
tions and desire for regulation, and di¤erences in family values/structures. The correlation
between labor market regulation and relatively slow moving cultural traits regarding the
family, and the fact that labor market regulation is complementary to certain family
values, explain the di¢ culty in liberalizing labor markets. In a sense the relatively low
employment and ine¢ ciency associated with labor market regulation is the price that
certain countries choose to pay in order to enjoy the benets of family ties and closeness.
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Figure 1 
The relation between the gains Γ(σ) to choose strong family ties rather than weak family ties and 
the share σ of individuals with strong family ties 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure2 
Preferred equilibrium in the (Δ(1),c) plane: regulation is preferred in the area above the thick curve 
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Figure 3 
Labor Market Regulation and Family Ties  
 
 
Figure 4 
Desire for Labor Market Regulation and Family Ties  
 
ARG
AUS
AUT
BGD
BLR
BEL
BIH
BRA
BGRCAN
CHL
CHN
HRV
CZE
DNK
EGY
EST
FIN
FRA
DEU GRC
HUN
ISL
IND
IRN
IRQ
IRL
ITA
JPN
JO
KGZ
LVA
LTU
MKD
MEX
MAR
NLD
NGA
NOR
PAK
PER
PHL
POL
PRT
PRI
ROM
SVN
ZAF
ESP
SWE
CHE
TUR
UGA
UKR
GBR
USA
VEN
VNM
ZWE
0
.5
1
1.
5
2
Fi
rin
g 
co
st
s
0 .2 .4 .6
Share of adults living in parental house
DZA
ARG
AUS
AUT
BGD
BEL
BRA
BGR
CAN
CHL
CHN
CZE
DNK
EST
FIN
FRA
DEU
GRCHUN
IND
IDN
ITALVA
LTU
MEX
MAR
NLD
NGA
PAK
PER
PHL
POL
PRT
ROM
RUS
SVK
SVN
ZAF
ESP
SWECHE
TUR
UKR
GBR
USA
VEN
0
.0
2
.0
4
.0
6
.0
8
M
in
im
um
 w
ag
e 
in
de
x
0 .2 .4 .6
Share of adults living in parental house
Labor market regulation and family ties
ARGAUS
AUT
BGD
BLR
BEL
BRAGR
CAN
CHL
CHN
HRV
CZE
DNK
EGY
EST
FIN
FRA
DEU GRC
HUN
ISL
IND
IRN
IRL
ITA
JPN
JOR
LVA
LTU
LUX
MEX
MAR
NLD
NGA
NOR
PER
PHL
POLPRT
PRI
ROM
RUS
SVK
SVN
ZAF
ESP
SWE
CHE
TUR
UGA
UKR
GBR
USA
VEN
VNM
ZWE
.2
.4
.6
.8
1
D
em
an
d 
fo
r j
ob
 s
ec
ur
ity
0 .2 .4 .6
Share of adults living in parental house
AUS
BGR
CAN
CZEFRA
DEU
HUN
IRL
ITA
LVA
NOR
PHL
POL
RUS
SVN
ESP
SWE
CHE
GBR
USA
.2
.4
.6
.8
1
D
em
an
d 
fo
r w
ag
e 
se
cu
rit
y
.1 .15 .2 .25 .3 .35
Share of adults living in parental house
Desire for labor market regulation and family ties
40 
 
Figure 5 
Labor market regulation and additional measures of family ties 
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Desire for labor market regulation and additional measures of family ties 
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Figure 7 
Correlation between inherited family ties and family ties in the home country 
 
 
Source: Share of adults living in parental house: WVS. Inherited family ties: GSS. Inherited 
family ties are the conditional average frequency of contacts with relatives by country of 
origin of US immigrants. Reference country of origin: Mexico  
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Table 1 
Pair-wise correlations between objective and subjective measures of family ties 
 Share of adult pop. 
in parental home 
Parents’ 
Responsibility
Respect 
parents 
Obedience Family 
important 
Parents 
proud 
Share of adult pop. in parent. home 1      
       
Parents’ respons. 0.68 1     
 (0.00)      
Respect parents 0.17 0.27 1    
 (0.13) (0.02)     
Obedience 0.34 0.43 0.66 1   
 (0.00) (0.36) (0.00)    
Family import. 0.26 0.36 0.49 0.38 1  
 (0.02) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)   
Parents proud 0.57 0.77 0.46 0.66 0.51 1 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)  
P-values in parenthesis 
 
 
 
Table 2 
Family Ties and Mobility  
Second Generation Immigrants, CPS 1994-2012. Microestimates 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Mobility Mobility Mobility Mobility Mobility Mobility 
Share of adult pop. in parent. home -0.021**      
 (0.011)      
Respect parents  -0.028***     
  (0.010)     
Obedience   -0.015*    
   (0.008)    
Parents proud    -0.007*   
    (0.004)   
Parents responsibility     -0.009  
     (0.008)  
Family important      -0.037*** 
      (0.012) 
Number of countries 71 71 75 74 71 71 
Observations 82926 105181 84571 84289 105149 105320 
Robust standard errors are clustered at the country of origin level. *** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%. 
Mobility is defined as a dummy equal to 1 is the individual moved from/in a different state, or abroad in the last five years. 
Regressions control for a quadratic in age, education, marital status, gender, children, a dummy if the person is unemployed, real 
personal income, dummies for race, state and year fixed effects. Family ties variables are measured in the country of origin from 
the WVS.  
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Table 3 
Family Ties and Unemployment   
Second Generation Immigrants, CPS 1994-2012. Microestimates 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Unempl. Unempl. Unempl. Unempl. Unempl. Unempl. 
Share adult pop. in parent. home 0.013      
 (0.018)      
Respect parents  0.048***     
  (0.015)     
Obedience   0.041***    
   (0.010)    
Parents proud    0.020***   
    (0.004)   
Parents responsibility     0.042***  
     (0.011)  
Family important      0.071*** 
      (0.015) 
Number of countries 71 71 75 74 71 71 
Observations 52982 67665 54117 53954 67658 67758 
Robust standard errors are clustered at the country of origin level. *** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 
10%. Unemployed is a dummy equal to 1 if the person is unemployed. Regressions control for a quadratic in age, education, 
marital status, a gender dummy, race dummies, state and year fixed effects. Family ties variables are measured in the country of 
origin from the WVS.  
 
Table 4 
Family Ties and Log Hourly Wages  
Second Generation Immigrant, CPS 1994-2012. Microestimates 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Log wages Log wages Log wages Log wages Log wages Log wages 
Share adult pop. in parent. home -0.189***      
 (0.071)      
Respect parents  -0.195***     
  (0.071)     
Obedience   -0.207***    
   (0.062)    
Parents proud    -0.089***   
    (0.021)   
Parents responsibility     -0.143***  
     (0.046)  
Family important      -0.300*** 
      (0.087) 
Number of countries 72 72 76 75 72 72 
Observations 60962 77983 62291 62137 78031 78158 
R-squared 0.27 0.27 0.27 0.27 0.27 0.27 
Robust standard errors are clustered at the country of origin level. *** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%. 
Regressions include controls for gender, education, quadratic in experience, marital status, number of children, dummies for race, 
state and year fixed effects. Family ties variables are measured in the country of origin from the WVS.  
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Table 5 
Family Values and Demand for Labor Regulation: 
Importance of job security – GSS 1977-2010 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Job security Job security Job security Job security Job security Job security
Share adult pop. in parent. home 0.807***      
 (0.107)      
Respect parents  0.631***     
  (0.126)     
Obedience   0.363**    
   (0.152)    
Parents proud    0.234***   
    (0.039)   
Parents responsibility     0.537***  
     (0.195)  
Family important      0.616** 
      (0.234) 
Number of countries 29 28 29 23 28 29 
Observations 13977 13862 13977 11985 13954 13977 
R-squared 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.09 
Robust standard errors are clustered at the ancestry level. *** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%. Regressions control 
for a quadratic in age, education, income, marital and employment status, number of children, a gender dummy, region and year fixed effects. 
Family ties variables are measured in the country of origin from the WVS.  
 
 
Table 6 
Family Values and Demand for Labor Regulation: 
Government support for declining industries – GSS 1977-2010 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Save jobs Save jobs Save jobs Save jobs Save jobs Save jobs 
Share adult pop. in parent. home 1.100***      
 (0.259)      
Respect parents  0.769***     
  (0.225)     
Obedience   0.430**    
   (0.209)    
Parents proud    0.277***   
    (0.084)   
Parents responsibility     0.660**  
     (0.295)  
Family important      0.725* 
      (0.362) 
Number of countries 29 28 29 23 28 29 
Observations 3167 3140 3167 2711 3160 3167 
R-squared 0.12 0.12 0.11 0.12 0.11 0.11 
Robust standard errors are clustered at the ancestry level. *** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%. 
Regressions control for a quadratic in age, education, income, marital and employment status, number of children, a gender 
dummy, region and year fixed effects. Family ties variables are measured in the country of origin from the WVS.  
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Table 7 
Family Values and Demand for Labor Regulation: 
Government should regulate wages – GSS 1977-2010 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Set wages Set wages Set wages Set wages Set wages Set wages 
Share adult pop. in parent. home 0.964***      
 (0.243)      
Respect parents  0.776***     
  (0.208)     
Obedience   0.427**    
   (0.204)    
Parents proud    0.269***   
    (0.072)   
Parents responsibility     0.615***  
     (0.220)  
Family important      0.774** 
      (0.289) 
Number of countries of origin 29 28 29 23 28 29 
Observations 2145 2126 2145 1845 2139 2145 
R-squared 0.07 0.07 0.06 0.07 0.07 0.06 
Robust standard errors are clustered at the ancestry level. *** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%. 
Regressions control for a quadratic in age, education, income, marital and employment status, number of children, a gender 
dummy and region fixed effects. Family ties variables are measured in the country of origin from the WVS.  
 
 
 
Table 8 
Family Values and Demand for Labor Regulation: 
Average Effect Size Coefficients – GSS 1977-2010 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 AES AES AES AES AES AES 
Share adult pop. in parent. home 0.504***      
 (0.106)      
Respect parents  0.402***     
  (0.092)     
Obedience   0.269***    
   (0.091)    
Parents proud    0.121***   
    (0.030)   
Parents responsibility     0.373***  
     (0.117)  
Family important      0.456*** 
      (0.151) 
Number of countries 29 28 29 23 28 29 
Observations 6430 6376 6430 5514 6418 6430 
Robust standard errors are clustered at the ancestry level. *** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%. 
AES averages the normalized treatment effects obtained from a seemingly unrelated regression in which each dependent 
variable is one of the desire for regulation measure. All regressions control for a quadratic in age, education, income, 
marital and employment status, number of children, gender dummies and region fixed effects. Family ties variables are 
measured in the country of origin from the WVS. The number of observations is the average number of observations in 
the regressions for the three attitude variables toward regulation.  
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Table 9 
Inherited Family Ties Before 1940 and Labor Regulation 
 (1) (2) 
Dependent variable Firing costs State regulation of  
minimum wage 
Inherited family ties  .554** .024** 
before 1940 (.206) (.010) 
Civil law origin .001 -.005 
 (.142) (.009) 
Scandinavian origin -.158 -.021 
 (.179) (.013) 
German origin -.058 -.007 
 (.146) (.010) 
Ln(population) .002 .003 
 (.043) (.002) 
Observations 24 23 
R-squared .48 .55 
Source: GSS, ILO (2007) and Botero et al. (2004). The reference group 
for legal origin is common law. Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
*** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%.  
 
 
 
 
Table 10 
Family Ties, Desire for Regulation and Medieval Family Structure  
 (1) (3) (2) 
VARIABLES Living with  
parents  
(adult children) 
 
Most important 
for a job:  
job security  
Government:  
help to  
protect jobs 
Egalitarian Nuclear Family 0.090*** 0.090 0.12 
 (0.029) (0.08) (0.09) 
Extended  Family 0.061** 0.14** 0.102 
 (0.022) (0.06) (0.082) 
Communitarian Family 0.092*** 0.15** 0.262** 
 (0.028) (0.07) (0.102) 
  
Observations 17854 19460 8659 
R-squared 0.347 0.090 0.167 
Notes [1] In columns 1 & 2, controls include gender, a quadratic in age, education, 
income, religious denomination dummies and time and country fixed effects. Source: 
WVS; [2] In column 3, controls include gender, a quadratic in age, education, income, 
unemployment status, political orientation, religious denomination and country fixed 
effects. Source: ISSP. [3] In both specifications, standard errors are clustered at the 
country level, *** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%. 
Appendix A
The aim of this appendix is to analyze the model when assumption 1 is not fullled in order to provide
necessary and su¢ cient conditions for the existence of every equilibrium.
Stage 3 is described in the main text. Let us describe stages 2 and 1.
Stage 2:
In stage 2, people vote to choose labor market institutions. The share of individuals with strong
family ties, ; chosen in stage 1 is given.
 First, let us analyze the situation where () > (1 c)=2: Then, if the labor market is rigid, workers
with strong family ties are immobile, since () > 1   c  () and we can write their expected
utility, dened equation (4) in the main text, in the simple following form:
USR = (1 R)w + (): (1)
We can compute the maximum expected utility that an individual with strong family ties gets
with a regulated labor market and compare it with what he gets when labor market are exible to
know when regulation is chosen rather than exibility. The optimal labor market regulation is the
couple of values of the minimum wage w and of the reservation productivity R that maximizes
the expected utility of workers with strong family ties, dened by equation (1), subject to the zero
prot condition: Z 1
R
(y   c  w)dy = 0: (2)
It is easily checked that the solution is
R = c and w =
1  c
2
(3)
Then, in case of stringent labor market regulation, workers with strong family ties get the expected
utility (from equations (1) and (3)):
USR =
(1  c)2
2
+ (): (4)
Comparison of this last equation and equation (2) in the main text implies that a median voter
with strong family ties prefers a regulated labor market rather than a exible labor market when
() > (1   c)=2. If () > 1=2; USF = () and it is obvious that USR > USF : If (1  c)2 =2 <
() < 1=2; USF = 1 () which is smaller than USR = (1 c)
2
2 +() if and only if 2 > 1  (1 c)
2
2 ;
i.e. if the cost of labor market regulation is small enough with respect to the value of family ties.
 Now, let us analyze the situation where  > 1=2 and ()  (1 c)=2: In this case, individuals with
strong family ties move if they do not get a job in their birth place. The optimal labor regulation
is the solution to
max
(R;w)
USR = (1 R)[w + ()] +R[1  c ()] (5)
subject to Z 1
R
(y   c  w)dy = 0: (6)
1
w + ()  1  c () (7)
Let us denote by  and  the Kuhn and Tucker multipliers associated with constraints (6) and (7)
respectively. The rst order conditions are
1  c  w   2()  (R  c  w) = 0 (8)
(1 R)  (1 R)   = 0 (9)
Suppose that constraint (7) is not binding so that  = 0: From equation (9),  = 0 implies that
 = 1: Then, equations (6) and (8) imply that
R = 1  2() and w = 1  c () (10)
Substituting this solution for w into equation (7), it turns out that constraint (7) is never binding.
Therefore, in the case where  > 1=2 and ()  (1  c)=2; equations (5) and (10) imply that the
expected utility obtained by individuals with strong family ties if the labor market is regulated is
USR = 1  c () [1  2()] ;
whereas individuals with strong family ties get
USF = 1 ()
if the labor market is exible. Individuals with strong family ties prefer labor market rigidity if and
only if
1  c () [1  2()] > 1 ()
which is equivalent to
c < 2 [()]
2
:
Finally, the situation which arises in stage 2, where individuals vote to choose the type of labor market
institution, can be summarized as follows:
 if   1=2; the median voter, who has weak family ties, chooses labor market exibility.
 if  > 1=2; the median voter, who has strong family ties, chooses to regulate the labor market if
either (1=2) > (1   c)=2 and (1=2) < 12   (1 c)
2
4 , or (1=2)  (1   c)=2 and c < 2 [(1=2)]2 :
Otherwise, the median voter chooses labor market exibility. Figure A1 depicts the choice of voters
when   1=2 in the (c; (1=2)) plane. It turns out that labor market rigidity is chosen if the value
of family ties is high with respect to the cost of labor market regulation.
Let us denote by F the set of values of  such that exibility is chosen in stage 2.
Stage 1
In stage one, individuals choose their family values. They have perfect foresights. If they anticipate
that ; the share of individuals with strong family ties, belongs to F; they anticipate that labor market
exibility will be the outcome of the vote in stage 2. Otherwise, the outcome of the vote will be labor
market regulation. Therefore, the expected utility of individuals with strong family ties is8<:
max[(); 1 ()] if  2 F
() + (1 c)
2
2 if  =2 F and () > 1 c2
1  c () [1  2()] if  =2 F and ()  1 c2
2
and the expected utility of individuals with weak family ties is1
1 if  2 F
1  c if  =2 F:
Thus, the utility gains of choosing strong family ties rather than weak family ties are
 () =
8<:
max[(); 1 ()]  1 if  2 F
()  1 c22 if  =2 F and () > 1 c2
() [2()  1] if  =2 F and ()  1 c2
In a Nash equilibrium, every individual takes  as given and chooses strong family ties if the gains of
doing so are positive and weak family ties otherwise.
It turns out that there exists a stable Nash equilibrium with  = 0 only if assumption 2 is satised,
i.e. if (0) < 1. If assumption 2 is not fullled, it is easily checked that  () > 0 for all ; which implies
that there is a single equilibrium with  = 1:
If assumption 2 is fullled, there is a stable equilibrium with  = 0. Then the denition of  ()
implies that there is either no other stable equilibrium if (1)  1 c22 or another stable equilibrium with
 = 1 if (1) > 1 c
2
2 :
1When the labor market is exible, the minimum wage, w = (1   c)=2; obtained by immobile workers, is smaller than
1  c; the wage of mobile workers.
3
4 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Figure A1: The choice of labor market regulation in stage 2 in the (Δ(1/2),c) plane when the 
share of individuals with strong family ties, σ, is larger than 1/2.  
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APPENDIX B 
 
Table B1 
Descriptive Statistics 
 
Panel A. World Value Survey and ISSP 
 WVS 1981-2005 ISSP (2006) 
VARIABLES Mean Std Mean Std 
Age 45.66 17.07 48.69 16.08 
Education 14.85 5.29 12.20 4.42 
Male .50 .50 .49 .50 
Low income  .25 .42 .24 .42 
Mid income .50 .49 .49 .49 
High Income .25 .43 .27 .44 
Employed .53 .49 .63 .48 
Unemployed .05 .21 .04 .19 
Inactive .42 .49 .33 .47 
Catholic .60 .48 .51 .49 
Protestant .38 .48 .31 .46 
Orthodox .01 .04 .00 .05 
Muslim .01 .04 .01 .08 
Buddhist .00 .04 .00 .02 
No religion .17 .38 
Left .28 .44 .34 .48 
Center .44 .49 .38 .48 
Right .28 .44 .28 .43 
Nuclear Family .13 .33 .18 .39 
Egalitarian .27 .44 .20 .38 
Stem  .43 .49 .50 .50 
Incomplete Stem .05 .22 .06 .25 
Communitarian  .12 .31 .06 .21 
   
Panel B. Cross country regressions 
 
 
Mean Std 
Firing costs 0.479 0.371 
Demand for job security 0.678 0.150 
Min. wage regulation 0.028 0.073 
Demand for wage security 0.594 0.175 
Share Living in parent. home .259 .104 
Legal origin: French .475 .504 
Legal origin: German .237 .429 
Legal origin: Scandinavian .085 .281 
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Panel C. General Social Survey and Current Population Survey 
 GSS 1977-
2010 
CPS 1994-
2012 
 Mean Std Mean Std 
Age 44.38 17.14 33.75 12.36 
Female 0.54 0.50 0.48 0.50 
Years of education 12.57 3.08   
<=12 years of schooling   0.45 0.50 
Some college   0.23 0.42 
Income 9.43 2.96 57205 49040 
Married 0.59 0.49 0.46 0.50 
Single 0.18 0.38 0.43 0.50 
Children 1.99 1.83 0.83 1.14 
Unemployed 0.03 0.17 0.08 0.28 
Employed 0.62 0.48   
Inactive 0.35    
Mobility   0.04 0.20 
Logwage   2.28 0.76 
Experience   14.09 12.12 
Job security 2.39 1.21   
Save jobs 3.49 1.10   
Set wages 2.62 1.17   
Living with parents 0.17 0.12 0.31 0.11 
Obedience 0.37 0.16 0.44 0.14 
Make parents proud 3.01 0.44 3.22 0.29 
Family important 3.86 0.09 3.91 0.08 
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Table B2 
Family Ties and the Regulation of Labor, Cross Country Evidence 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES Firing  
Costs 
Demand for 
job security 
Min. Wage  
Regulation 
Demand for  
wage security 
     
Share adult pop. in parent. home 1.003*** 0.561*** 0.047** 0.763 
 (0.320) (0.208) (0.019) (0.491) 
LO: French 0.353*** -0.066* -0.005 0.214** 
 (0.111) (0.036) (0.008) (0.089) 
LO : German 0.181* -0.080* -0.014* 0.138 
 (0.104) (0.042) (0.008) (0.089) 
LO : Scandinavian 0.261** -0.051 -0.032*** -0.028 
 (0.124) (0.063) (0.009) (0.137) 
(Ln) Population  0.085*** 0.007 -0.001 -0.033 
 (0.031) (0.012) (0.002) (0.031) 
     
Observations 60 58 46 20 
R-squared 0.389 0.250 0.384 0.560 
LO : Common Law reference. Source: ISSP ILO, WB and WVS; Robust standard errors in 
parentheses, *** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, significant at 10%.  
 
Table B2 (bis)   
Family ties and Employment Protection:  
Regular versus Temporary contracts, OECD countries 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES Regular  
contracts 
Temporary  
contracts 
Global  
Index 
    
Family Ties 2.332* 2.680* 1.666* 
 (1.215) (1.451) (0.824) 
LO: French 0.697* 2.342*** 1.335*** 
 (0.341) (0.407) (0.231) 
LO : German 0.779** 1.227*** 0.937*** 
 (0.346) (0.413) (0.235) 
LO : Scandinavian 0.798* 1.314** 0.929*** 
 (0.444) (0.530) (0.301) 
(Ln) Population  -0.004 0.019 -0.013 
 (0.075) (0.089) (0.051) 
    
Observations 33 33 33 
R-squared 0.287 0.631 0.625 
     LO : Common Law reference. Source: WVS 1980-2000 and OECD 
2008. Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** significant at 1%, ** 
significant at 5%, significant at 10%.  
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Table B3 
Family Ties and Log Hourly Wages 
Second gen. immigrants, CPS 1994-2012, controlling for real per capita GDP in the country of origin 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Log wage Log wage Log wage Log wage Log wage Log wage 
Share of adult pop. in parent. home -0.208**      
 (0.101)      
Respect parents  -0.031     
  (0.068)     
Obedience   -0.179**    
   (0.080)    
Parents proud    -0.073**   
    (0.035)   
Parents responsibility     -0.093*  
     (0.054)  
Family important      -0.214*** 
      (0.079) 
Real per capita GDP country of origin -0.000 0.000** -0.000 0.000 0.000* 0.000** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Observations 51902 57986 53024 52870 58034 58161 
R-squared 0.27 0.28 0.27 0.27 0.28 0.28 
Robust standard errors are clustered at the country of origin level. *** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%. 
Regressions include controls for gender, education, quadratic in experience, marital status, number of children, dummies for race, state 
and year fixed effects. Family ties variables are measured in the country of origin from the WVS.  
 
Table B4 
Family Ties and Mobility 
Second Gen. Immigrants, CPS 1994-2012, controlling for real per capita GDP in the country of origin 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Mobility Mobility Mobility Mobility Mobility Mobility 
Share adult pop. in parent. home -0.095***      
 (0.030)      
Respect parents  -0.040     
  (0.033)     
Obedience   -0.053***    
   (0.017)    
Parents proud    -0.024**   
    (0.010)   
Parents responsibility     -0.028  
     (0.021)  
Family important      -0.055*** 
      (0.018) 
Real per capita GDP country of origin 0.000 0.000*** 0.000** 0.000 0.000*** 0.000*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Observations 72365 79093 73799 73510 79062 79243 
Robust standard errors are clustered at the country of origin level. *** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%. Mobility is 
defined as a dummy equal to 1 is the individual moved from/in a different state, or abroad in the last five years. Regressions control for a 
quadratic in age, education, marital status, gender, children, a dummy if the person is unemployed, real personal income, dummies for race, 
state and year fixed effects. Family ties variables are measured in the country of origin from the WVS.  
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Table B5 
Family Ties and Unemployment 
Second Gen. Immigrants, CPS 1994-2012, controlling for real per capita GDP in the country of origin 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Unempl. Unempl. Unempl. Unempl. Unempl. Unempl. 
Share adult pop. in parent. home 0.066***      
 (0.021)      
Respect parents  0.026     
  (0.018)     
Obedience   0.044***    
   (0.016)    
Make parents proud    0.025***   
    (0.009)   
Parents responsbility     0.033**  
     (0.014)  
Family important      0.052*** 
      (0.014) 
Real per capita GDP country of origin 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.000** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Observations 44220 48772 45180 45017 48765 48865 
Robust standard errors are clustered at the country of origin level. *** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%. 
Unemployed is a dummy equal to 1 if the person is unemployed. Regressions control for a quadratic in age, education, marital status, a 
gender dummy, race dummies, state and year fixed effects. Family ties variables are measured in the country of origin from the WVS.  
 
 
Table B6 
Family Values and Demand for Labor Regulation, controlling for real per capita GDP in the country 
of origin, Average Effect Size Coefficients – GSS 1977-2010 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 AES AES AES AES AES AES 
Share adult pop. in parent. home 0.506***      
 (0.163)      
Respect parents  0.296**     
  (0.125)     
Obedience   0.037    
   (0.084)    
Parents proud    0.056   
    (0.070) 0.137  
Parents responsibility     (0.100)  
      0.095 
Family important      (0.124) 
       
Real per capita GDP country origin -0.000 -0.000 -0.000** -0.000 -0.000** -0.000** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Observations 4059 4017 4059 3340 4050 4059 
Robust standard errors are clustered at the ancestry level. *** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%. AES 
averages the normalized treatment effects obtained from a seemingly unrelated regression in which each dependent variable is 
one of the desire for regulation measure. All regressions control for a quadratic in age, education, income, marital and 
employment status, number of children, gender dummies and region fixed effects. Family ties variables are measured in the 
country of origin from the WVS. The number of observations is the average number of observations in the regressions for the 
three attitude variables toward regulation. 
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Table B7 
Family Ties and Log Hourly Wages 
Second Generation Immigrants, CPS 1994-2012 
Controlling for human capital in the country of origin 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Log wage Log wage Log wage Log wage Log wage Log wage 
Share adult pop. in parent. home -0.254**      
 (0.109)      
Respect parents  -0.099     
  (0.060)     
Obedience   -0.168*    
   (0.084)    
Make parents proud    -0.071**   
    (0.033)   
Parents responsibility     -0.112**  
     (0.055)  
Family important      -0.216*** 
      (0.072) 
Human capital country of origin -0.004 0.006 0.001 0.002 0.006 0.007* 
 (0.007) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) 
Observations 51049 57133 52171 52017 57181 57308 
R-squared 0.27 0.27 0.27 0.27 0.27 0.28 
Robust standard errors are clustered at the country of origin level. *** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%. 
Regressions include controls for gender, education, quadratic in experience, marital status, number of children, dummies for race, 
state and year fixed effects. Family ties variables are measured in the country of origin from the WVS.  
 
Table B8 
Family Ties and Mobility 
Second Gen. Immigrants, CPS 1994-2012, controlling for human capital in the country of origin 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Mobility Mobility Mobility Mobility Mobility Mobility 
Share adult pop. in parent. home -0.058**      
 (0.027)      
Respect parents  -0.043*     
  (0.023)     
Obedience   -0.042**    
   (0.017)    
Parents proud    -0.019***   
    (0.007)   
Parents responsibility     -0.031*  
     (0.016)  
Family important      -0.054*** 
      (0.010) 
Human capital in the country of origin 0.005*** 0.006*** 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.007*** 0.007*** 
 (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Observations 71215 77943 72649 72360 77912 78093 
Robust standard errors are clustered at the country of origin level. *** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%. Mobility is 
defined as a dummy equal to 1 is the individual moved from/in a different state, or abroad in the last five years. Regressions control for a 
quadratic in age, education, marital status, gender, children, a dummy if the person is unemployed, real personal income, dummies for race, 
state and year fixed effects. Family ties variables are measured in the country of origin from the WVS.  
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Table B9 
Family Ties and Unemployment 
Second Gen. Immigrants, CPS 1994-2012, controlling for human capital in the country of origin 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Unempl. Unempl. Unempl. Unempl. Unempl. Unempl. 
Share adult pop. in parent. home 0.064***      
 (0.020)      
Respect parents  0.030**     
  (0.013)     
Obedience   0.041**    
   (0.017)    
Parents proud    0.021***   
    (0.008)   
Parents responsibility     0.034***  
     (0.012)  
Family important      0.054*** 
      (0.013) 
Human capital in the country of origin 0.000 -0.002* -0.001 -0.001 -0.002* -0.002** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Observations 43506 48058 44466 44303 48051 48151 
Robust standard errors are clustered at the country of origin level. *** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%. 
Unemployed is a dummy equal to 1 if the person is unemployed. Regressions control for a quadratic in age, education, marital 
status, a gender dummy, race dummies, state and year fixed effects. Family ties variables are measured in the country of origin from 
the WVS.  
 
Table B10 
Family Values and Demand for Labor Regulation, controlling human capital in the country of origin 
(Average Effect Size Coefficients – GSS 1977-2010) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 AES AES AES AES AES AES 
Share adult pop. in parent. home 0.335*      
 (0.204)      
Respect parents  0.222**     
  (0.106)     
Obedience   -0.063    
   (0.091)    
Parents proud    0.040   
    (0.067)   
Parents responsibility     0.137*  
     (0.081)  
Family important      -0.090 
      (0.116) 
Human capital country of origin -0.025** -0.032*** -0.045*** -0.038*** -0.048*** -0.044*** 
 (0.012) (0.011) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.013) 
Observations 4059 4017 4059 3340 4050 4059 
Robust standard errors are clustered at the ancestry level. *** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%. 
AES averages the normalized treatment effects obtained from a seemingly unrelated regression in which each dependent 
variable is one of the desire for regulation measure. All regressions control for a quadratic in age, education, income, 
marital and employment status, number of children, gender dummies and region fixed effects. Family ties variables are 
measured in the country of origin from the WVS. The number of observations is the average number of observations in 
the regressions for the three attitude variables toward regulation.  
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Table B11 
Family Values and Demand for Labor Regulation, controlling for parents’ education 
Average Effect Size Coefficients – GSS 1977-2010 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 AES AES AES AES AES AES 
Share adult pop. in parent. home 0.436***      
 (0.095)      
Respect parents  0.347***     
  (0.081)     
Obedience   0.229***    
   (0.084)    
Parents proud    0.106***   
    (0.029)   
Parents responsibility     0.318***  
     (0.109)  
Family important      0.340*** 
      (0.127) 
Observations 4123 4091 4123 3632 4116 4123 
Robust standard errors are clustered at the ancestry level. *** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%. 
AES averages the normalized treatment effects obtained from a seemingly unrelated regression in which each dependent 
variable is one of the desire for regulation measure. All regressions control for a quadratic in age, education, education of 
both parents, income, marital and employment status, number of children, gender dummies and region fixed effects. 
Family ties variables are measured in the country of origin from the WVS. The number of observations is the average 
number of observations in the regressions for the three attitude variables toward regulation.  
 
 
 
Table B12 
Family Ties and Log Hourly Wages 
Second Generation Immigrants, CPS 1994-2012 
Controlling for ethnic human capital of first generation immigrants 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Log wage Log wage Log wage Log wage Log wage Log wage 
Share of adult pop. in parental home -0.104*      
 (0.061)      
Respect parents  -0.062     
  (0.056)     
Obedience   -0.144**    
   (0.060)    
Parents proud    -0.073***   
    (0.026)   
Parents responsibility     -0.115**  
     (0.044)  
Family important      -0.179*** 
      (0.064) 
Ethnic human capital 0.028** 0.036*** 0.031*** 0.033*** 0.039*** 0.035*** 
 (0.010) (0.007) (0.008) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) 
Observations 51618 63991 52740 52586 64039 64166 
R-squared 0.28 0.28 0.28 0.28 0.28 0.28 
Robust standard errors are clustered at the country of origin level. *** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%. 
Regressions include controls for gender, education, quadratic in experience, marital status, number of children, dummies for race, 
state and year fixed effects. Family ties variables are measured in the country of origin from the WVS.  
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Table B13 
Family Ties and Mobility 
Second Generation Immigrants, CPS 1994-2012 
Controlling for ethnic human capital of first generation immigrants 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Mobility Mobility Mobility Mobility Mobility Mobility 
Share adult pop. in parent. home -0.118***      
 (0.024)      
Respect parents  -0.094***     
  (0.028)     
Obedience   -0.078***    
   (0.015)    
Parents proud    -0.037***   
    (0.006)   
Parents responsibility     -0.063***  
     (0.018)  
Family important      -0.079*** 
      (0.026) 
Ethnic human capital -0.001 0.005** 0.004* 0.006** 0.008*** 0.006** 
 (0.004) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) 
Observations 72160 88649 73594 73305 88618 88799 
Robust standard errors are clustered at the country of origin level. *** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%. Mobility is 
defined as a dummy equal to 1 is the individual moved from/in a different state, or abroad in the last five years. Regressions control for a 
quadratic in age, education, marital status, gender, children, a dummy if the person is unemployed, real personal income, dummies for race, 
state and year fixed effects. Family ties variables are measured in the country of origin from the WVS.  
 
Table B14 
Family Ties and Unemployment 
Second Gen. Immigrants, CPS 1994-2012 
Controlling for ethnic human capital of first generation immigrants 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Unempl. Unempl. Unempl. Unempl. Unempl. Unempl. 
Share adult pop. in parent. home 0.051***      
 (0.015)      
Respect parents  0.043***     
  (0.012)     
Obedience   0.046***    
   (0.010)    
Make parents proud    0.023***   
    (0.005)   
Parents responsibility     0.044***  
     (0.011)  
Family important      0.061*** 
      (0.010) 
Ethnic human capital -0.003 -0.004*** -0.005*** -0.006*** -0.005*** -0.004*** 
 (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) 
Number of countries       
Observations 44123 54678 45083 44920 54671 54771 
Robust standard errors are clustered at the country of origin level. *** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%. 
Unemployed is a dummy equal to 1 if the person is unemployed. Regressions control for a quadratic in age, education, marital 
status, a gender dummy, race dummies, state and year fixed effects. Family ties variables are measured in the country of origin 
from the WVS.  
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Table B15 
Family Values and Demand for Labor Regulation, controlling for ethnic human capital of first 
generation immigrants, Average Effect Size Coefficients – GSS 1977-2010 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 AES AES AES AES AES AES 
Share adult pop. in parent. home 0.575***      
 (0.135)      
Respect parents  0.390***     
  (0.118)     
Obedience   0.345***    
   (0.133)    
Parents proud    0.160***   
    (0.042)   
Parents responsibility     0.417**  
     (0.171)  
Family important      0.477** 
      (0.208) 
Ethnic human capital -0.024 -0.014 -0.010 -0.041 -0.016 -0.005 
 (0.020) (0.023) (0.026) (0.023) (0.034) (0.029) 
Observations 5385 5343 5385 4667 5376 5385 
Robust standard errors are clustered at the ancestry level. *** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%. 
AES averages the normalized treatment effects obtained from a seemingly unrelated regression in which each dependent 
variable is one of the desire for regulation measure. All regressions control for a quadratic in age, education, income, 
marital and employment status, number of children, gender dummies and region fixed effects. Family ties variables are 
measured in the country of origin from the WVS. The number of observations is the average number of observations in 
the regressions for the three attitude variables toward regulation.  
 
 
Table B16 
Family Ties and Log Hourly Wages 
Second Generation Immigrants, CPS 1994-2012, controlling for trust as a cultural variable 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Log wage Log wage Log wage Log wage Log wage Log wage 
Share adult pop. in parent. home -0.114      
 (0.072)      
Respect parents  -0.123     
  (0.080)     
Obedience   -0.164**    
   (0.072)    
Make parents proud    -0.073***   
    (0.025)   
Parents responsibility     -0.097*  
     (0.051)  
Family important      -0.243** 
      (0.096) 
Trust 0.133* 0.100 0.061 0.040 0.101 0.067 
 (0.078) (0.076) (0.072) (0.077) (0.066) (0.065) 
Observations 60962 77983 62291 62137 78031 78158 
R-squared 0.27 0.27 0.27 0.27 0.27 0.27 
Robust standard errors are clustered at the country of origin level. *** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%. 
Regressions include controls for gender, education, quadratic in experience, marital status, number of children, dummies for race, 
state and year fixed effects. Family ties variables are measured in the country of origin from the WVS.  
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Table B17 
Family Ties and Mobility 
Second Generation Immigrants, CPS 1994-2012, controlling for trust as a cultural variable 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Mobility Mobility Mobility Mobility Mobility Mobility 
Share adult pop. in parent. home -0.108***      
 (0.015)      
Respect parents  -0.072***     
  (0.024)     
Obedience   -0.061***    
   (0.015)    
Parents proud    -0.025***   
    (0.009)   
Parents responsibility     -0.028  
     (0.020)  
Family important      -0.055 
      (0.035) 
Trust 0.030* 0.017 0.019 0.017 0.038 0.033 
 (0.017) (0.022) (0.020) (0.026) (0.026) (0.028) 
Observations 86482 109871 88176 87887 109840 110021 
Robust standard errors are clustered at the country of origin level. *** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%. 
Mobility is defined as a dummy equal to 1 is the individual moved from/in a different state, or abroad in the last five years. 
Regressions control for a quadratic in age, education, marital status, gender, children, a dummy if the person is unemployed, real 
personal income, dummies for race, state and year fixed effects. Family ties variables are measured in the country of origin from the 
WVS.  
 
 
Table B18 
Family Ties and Unemployment 
Second Generation Immigrants, CPS 1994-2012, controlling for trust as a cultural variable 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Unempl. Unempl. Unempl. Unempl. Unempl. Unempl. 
Share adult pop. in parent. home 0.026      
 (0.018)      
Respect parents  0.053***     
  (0.019)     
Obedience   0.050***    
   (0.014)    
Parents proud    0.024***   
    (0.006)   
Parents responsibility     0.049***  
     (0.013)  
Family important      0.080*** 
      (0.021) 
Trust -0.039** -0.020 -0.012 -0.005 -0.006 -0.009 
 (0.017) (0.022) (0.016) (0.018) (0.018) (0.017) 
Observations 52982 67665 54117 53954 67658 67758 
Robust standard errors are clustered at the country of origin level. *** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%. 
Unemployed is a dummy equal to 1 if the person is unemployed. Regressions control for a quadratic in age, education, marital 
status, a gender dummy, race dummies, state and year fixed effects. Family ties variables are measured in the country of origin 
from the WVS.  
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Table B19 
Family Values and Demand for Labor Regulation, controlling for trust as a cultural variable 
Average Effect Size Coefficients – GSS 1977-2010 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 AES AES AES AES AES AES 
Share adult pop. in parent. home 0.496***      
 (0.102)      
Respect parents  0.397***     
  (0.086)     
Obedience   0.235***    
   (0.088)    
Parents proud    0.127***   
    (0.033)   
Parents responsibility     0.363***  
     (0.101)  
Family important      0.426** 
      (0.177) 
Trust 0.087*** 0.084*** 0.095*** 0.075*** 0.092*** 0.095*** 
 (0.021) (0.020) (0.020) (0.019) (0.021) (0.020) 
Observations 3853 3827 3853 3417 3848 3853 
Robust standard errors are clustered at the ancestry level. *** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%. 
AES averages the normalized treatment effects obtained from a seemingly unrelated regression in which each dependent 
variable is one of the desire for regulation measure. All regressions control for a quadratic in age, education, income, 
marital and employment status, number of children, gender dummies and region fixed effects. Family ties variables are 
measured in the country of origin from the WVS. The number of observations is the average number of observations in 
the regressions for the three attitude variables toward regulation. 
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Table B20 
Family Ties and Mobility  
Second Generation Immigrants, Census 1940, 1960 and 1970 
 
CENSUS 1940 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Mobility Mobility Mobility Mobility Mobility Mobility 
Share adult pop. in parent. home -0.215      
 (0.046)***      
Respect parents  -0.102     
  (0.023)***     
Obedience   -0.057    
   (0.027)**    
Make parents proud    -0.056   
    (0.013)***   
Parents responsibility     -0.049  
     (0.037)  
Family important      -0.061 
      (0.036) 
Observations 28769 38479 29820 29820 36172 36425 
 
CENSUS 1960 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Mobility Mobility Mobility Mobility Mobility Mobility 
Share adult pop. in parent. home -0.212      
 (0.026)***      
 Respect parents  -0.105     
  (0.021)***     
Obedience   -0.083    
   (0.028)***    
Make parents proud    -0.043   
    (0.012)***   
Parents responsibility     -0.043  
     (0.031)  
Family important      -0.066 
      (0.042) 
Observations 119293 146774 122212 122212 141176 142398 
 
CENSUS 1970 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Mobility Mobility Mobility Mobility Mobility Mobility 
Share adult pop. in parent. home -0.197      
 (0.022)***      
Respect parents  -0.083     
  (0.022)***     
Obedience   -0.079    
   (0.024)***    
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Make parents proud    -0.034   
    (0.011)***   
Parents responsibility     -0.037  
     (0.030)  
Family important      -0.068 
      (0.038)* 
Observations 99260 120719 101495 101495 116384 117471 
Robust standard errors are clustered at the country of origin level. *** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%. 
Each regression controls for a quadratic in age, education, marital status, gender, a dummy for being unemployed, personal 
income and state fixed effects. 
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Table B21 
Family Ties and Unemployment  
Second Generation Immigrants, Census 1940, 1960 and 1970 
 
CENSUS 1940 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Unempl. Unempl. Unempl. Unempl. Unempl. Unempl. 
Share adult pop. in parent. home 0.217      
 (0.051)***      
Respect parents  0.095     
  (0.026)***     
Obedience   0.076    
   (0.039)*    
Make parents proud    0.043   
    (0.015)***   
Parents responsibility     0.115  
     (0.029)***  
Family important      0.133 
      (0.034)***
Observations 18088 24215 18679 18679 22736 22887 
 
CENSUS 1960 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Unempl. Unempl. Unempl. Unempl. Unempl. Unempl. 
Share adult pop. in parent. home 0.055      
 (0.016)***      
Respect parents  0.033     
  (0.010)***     
Obedience   0.045    
   (0.013)***    
Make parents proud    0.015   
    (0.006)**   
Parents responsibility     0.027  
     (0.010)***  
Family important      0.042 
      (0.013)***
Observations 78431 96485 80268 80268 92832 93680 
 
CENSUS 1970 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Unempl. Unempl. Unempl. Unempl. Unempl. Unempl. 
Share adult pop. in parent. home 0.016      
 (0.015)      
       
Respect parents  0.016     
  (0.007)**     
Obedience   0.025    
   (0.013)**    
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Make parents proud    0.008   
    (0.005)*   
Parents responsibility     0.015  
     (0.009)*  
      0.014 
      (0.012) 
Inherited family values (GSS)       
       
Observations 67067 81816 68551 68551 78915 79682 
Robust standard errors are clustered at the country of origin level. *** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%. 
Each regression controls for a quadratic in age, education, marital status, gender and state fixed effects. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
21 
 
 
Table B22 
Family Ties and Log Hourly Wages  
Second Generation Immigrants, Census 1940, 1960 and 1970 
 
CENSUS 1940 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Log wage Log wage Log wage Log wage Log wage Log wage
Share adult pop. in parent. home -0.617      
 (0.237)**      
 Respect parents  -0.185     
  (0.094)*     
Obedience   -0.236    
   (0.105)**    
Make parents proud    -0.120   
    (0.047)**   
Parents responsibility     -0.057  
     (0.094)  
Family important      -0.054 
      (0.147) 
Observations 11718 15833 12106 12106 14833 14934 
R-squared 0.20 0.21 0.21 0.21 0.20 0.20 
 
CENSUS 1960 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Log wage Log wage Log wage Log wage Log wage Log wage
Share adult pop. in parental home -0.336      
 (0.140)**      
Respect parents  -0.075     
  (0.070)     
Obedience   -0.154    
   (0.096)    
Make parents proud    -0.050   
    (0.037)   
Parents’ responsibility     -0.087  
     (0.062)  
Family important      -0.148 
      (0.109) 
Observations 61028 75346 62409 62409 72408 73044 
R-squared 0.19 0.18 0.18 0.18 0.18 0.18 
 
CENSUS 1970 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Log wage Log wage Log wage Log wage Log wage Log wage
Share adult pop. in parental home -0.284      
 (0.134)**      
Respect parents  -0.098     
  (0.082)     
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Obedience   -0.163    
   (0.092)*    
Make parents proud    -0.064   
    (0.035)*   
Parents’ responsibility     -0.210  
     (0.080)**  
Family important      -0.261 
      (0.131)* 
Observations 56291 68766 57494 57494 66303 66931 
R-squared 0.21 0.21 0.21 0.21 0.21 0.21 
Robust standard errors are clustered at the country of origin level. *** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 
10%. Each regression controls for education, a quadratic in experience, marital status, gender and state fixed effects. 
 
Table B23 
Family Ties and Log Hourly Wages 
Second Generation Immigrants, CPS 1994-2012 
Sample restricted to second generation immigrants with parents from the same country of origin 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Log wage Log wage Log wage Log wage Log wage Log wage 
Share adult pop. in parent. home -0.178*      
 (0.100)      
Respect parents  -0.308***     
  (0.110)     
Obedience   -0.239***    
   (0.079)    
Make parents proud    -0.103***   
    (0.025)   
Parents responsibility     -0.169***  
     (0.064)  
Family important      -0.288*** 
      (0.108) 
Observations 35167 43222 35447 35398 43226 43248 
R-squared 0.28 0.28 0.28 0.28 0.28 0.28 
Robust standard errors are clustered at the country of origin level. *** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%. 
Regressions include controls for gender, education, quadratic in experience, marital status, number of children, dummies for race, 
state and year fixed effects. Family ties variables are measured in the country of origin from the WVS.  
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Table B24 
Family Ties and Mobility 
Second Generation Immigrants, CPS 1994-2012 
Sample restricted to second generation immigrants with parents from the same country of origin 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Mobility Mobility Mobility Mobility Mobility Mobility 
Share adult pop. in parent. home -0.128***      
 (0.032)      
Respect parents  -0.080**     
  (0.039)     
Obedience   -0.070***    
   (0.023)    
Parents proud    -0.026*   
    (0.013)   
Parents responsibility     -0.035*  
     (0.021)  
Family important      -0.059 
      (0.042) 
Observations 54334 66506 54726 54614 66466 66528 
Robust standard errors are clustered at the country of origin level. *** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%. 
Mobility is defined as a dummy equal to 1 is the individual moved from/in a different state, or abroad in the last five years. 
Regressions control for a quadratic in age, education, marital status, gender, children, a dummy if the person is unemployed, real 
personal income, dummies for race, state and year fixed effects. Family ties variables are measured in the country of origin from the 
WVS.  
 
 
 
 
Table B25 
Family Ties and Unemployment 
Second Generation Immigrants, CPS 1994-2012 
Sample restricted to second generation immigrants with parents from the same country of origin 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Unempl. Unempl. Unempl. Unempl. Unempl. Unempl. 
Share adult pop. in parent. home 0.029      
 (0.035)      
 Respect parents  0.103***     
  (0.019)     
Obedience   0.066***    
   (0.018)    
Make parents proud    0.033***   
    (0.007)   
Parents responsibility     0.067***  
     (0.013)  
Family important      0.104*** 
      (0.024) 
Observations 32755 40295 33008 32952 40286 40310 
Robust standard errors are clustered at the country of origin level. *** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%. 
Unemployed is a dummy equal to 1 if the person is unemployed. Regressions control for a quadratic in age, education, marital 
status, a gender dummy, race dummies, state and year fixed effects. Family ties variables are measured in the country of origin 
from the WVS.  
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Table B26 
Correlation between the GSS measure of family values and the WVS measure, GSS 1972-2010 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Frequency of 
contacts with 
relatives 
Frequency of 
contacts with 
relatives 
Frequency of 
contacts with 
relatives 
Frequency of 
contacts with 
relatives 
Frequency of 
contacts with 
relatives 
Frequency of 
contacts with 
relatives 
Share adult home in parent. home 0.589***      
 (0.149)      
 Respect parents  0.388***     
  (0.130)     
 Obedience   0.207    
   (0.124)    
Parents proud    0.131***   
    (0.042)   
Parents responsibility     0.380**  
     (0.141)  
Family important      0.427** 
      (0.175) 
Observations 16641 16503 16642 14091 16609 16641 
R-squared 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.05 0.04 0.04 
Robust standard errors are clustered at the ancestry level. *** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%. Regressions control for 
a quadratic in age, education, income, marital and employment status, number of children, a gender dummy, region and year fixed effects. Family 
ties variables are measured in the country of origin from the WVS.  
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Figure 3bis 
Family Ties and Employment Protection in OECD countries (regular and temporary contracts) 
 
           Source: WVS 1980-2000 and OECD (2008) 
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Figure 8 
Family Types in Europe (Todd classification) 
 
